C.I.A.: Maker of Policy, or Tool?

The Central Intelligence Agency, which does not often appear in the news, made headlines on two counts in recent days. The agency was found to have interceded in the slander trial of one of its agents in an effort to obtain his exoneration without explanation except that he had done its bidding in the interests of national security. And it was reported to have planted at least five agents among Michigan State University scholars engaged in a foreign aid project some years ago in Vietnam. Although the specific work of these agents and the circumstances of their employment are in dispute, reports of their activities have raised many questions about the purposes and methods of the C.I.A., and about its relationship to other parts of the Government and nongovernmental institutions. Even larger questions about control of the C.I.A. within the framework of a free government and about its role in foreign affairs are periodically brought up in Congress and among other governments. To provide background for these questions, and to determine what issues of public policy are posed by the agency's work, The New York Times has spent several months looking into its affairs. This series is the result.

Survey Finds Widely Feared Agency Is Tightly Controlled

Following is the first of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other members of the Times staff.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 24—One day in 1960 an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency caught a plane in Tokyo, flew to Singapore and checked into a hotel room in time to receive a visitor. The agent plugged a lie detector into an overloaded electrical circuit and blew out the lights in the building.

In the investigation that followed, the agent and a C.I.A. colleague were arrested and jailed as American spies.

The result was an international incident that infuriated London, not once but twice. It embarrassed an American Ambassador. It led an American Secretary of State to write a rare letter of apology to a foreign Chief of State.

Five years later that foreign leader was handed an opportunity to denounce the perfidy of all Americans and of the C.I.A. in particular, thus increasing the apprehension of his Oriental neighbors about the agency and enhancing his own political position.

Ultimately, the incident led the United States Government to tell a lie in public and then to admit the lie even more publicly.

The lie was no sooner disclosed than a world predisposed to suspicion of the C.I.A. and unaware of what really had happened in Singapore five years earlier began to repeat questions that have dogged the intelligence agency and the United States Government for years:

¶Was this secret body, which was known to have overthrown governments and installed others, raised armies, staged an invasion of Cuba, spied and counterspied, established airlines, radio stations and schools and supported books, magazines and businesses, running out of the control of its supposed political master?

¶Was it in fact damaging, while it sought to advance, the national interest? Could it spend huge sums for ransoms, bribes and subversion without check or regard for the consequences?

¶Did it lie to or influence the political leaders of the United States to such an extent that it really was an "invisible government" more powerful than even the President?

These are questions constantly asked around the world. Some of them were raised again recently when it was disclosed that Michigan State University was the cover for some C.I.A. agents in South Vietnam during a multimillion-dollar technical assistance program the university conducted for the regime of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Last week, it also became known that an Estonian refugee who was being sued for slander in a Federal District Court in Baltimore was resting his defense on the fact that the alleged slander had been committed in the course of his duties as a C.I.A. agent.

In a public memorandum addressed to the court, the C.I.A. stated that it had ordered the agent, Juri Raus, to disclose no further details of the case, in order to protect the nation's foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr. Raus is claiming complete legal immunity from the suit on the grounds that he had acted as an official agent of the Federal Government.

Such incidents, bringing the activities of the C.I.A. into dim and often dismaying public view, have caused members of Congress and many publications to question ever more persistently the role and propriety of one of Washington's most discussed and least understood institutions. Some of the misgivings have been shared by at least two American President, Harry S. Truman and John F. Kennedy.

A Wide Examination

To seek reliable answers to these questions; to sift, where possible, fact from fancy and theory from condition; to determine what real questions of public policy and international relations are posed by the existence and operations of the C.I.A., The New York Times has compiled information and opinions from informed Americans throughout the world.

It has obtained reports from 20 foreign correspondents and editors with recent service in more than 35 countries and from reporters in Washington who interviewed more than 50 present and former Government officials, members of Congress and military officers.

This study, carried out over several months, disclosed, for instance, that the Singapore affair resulted not from a lack or political control or from recklessness by the C.I.A., but from bad fortune and diplomatic blundering.

It found that the C.I.A., for all its fearsome reputation, is under far more stringent political and budgetary control than most of its critics know or concede, and that since the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba in 1961 these controls have been tightly exercised.

The consensus of those interviewed was that the critics' favorite recommendation for a stronger rein on the agency—a Congressional committee to oversee the C.I.A.—would probably provide little more real control than now exists and might both restrict the agency's effectiveness and actually shield it from those who desire more knowledge about its operations.

A Matter of Will

Other important conclusions of the study include the following:

¶While the institutional *forms* of political control appear effective and sufficient, it is really the *will* of the political officials who must exert control that is important and that has most often been lacking.

¶Even when control is tight and effective, a more important question may concern the extent to which C.I.A. information and

policy judgments affect political decisions in foreign affairs.

¶Whether or not political control is being exercised, the more serious question is whether the very existence of an efficient C.I.A. causes the United States Government to rely too much on clandestine and illicit activities, back-alley tactics, subversion and what is known in official jargon as "dirty tricks."

¶Finally, regardless of the facts, the C.I.A.'s reputation in the world is so horrendous and its role in events so exaggerated that it is becoming a burden on American foreign policy, rather that the secret weapon it was intended to be.

The Singapore incident, with its bizarre repercussions five years later, is an excellent lesson in how that has happened, although none of the fears of the critics are justified by the facts of the particular case.

Problem in Singapore

The ill-fated agent who blew out the lights flew from Tokyo to Singapore only after a prolonged argument inside the C.I.A. Singapore, a strategic Asian port with a large Chinese population, was soon to get its independence from Britain and enter the Malaysian Federation. Should C.I.A. recruit some well-placed spies, or should it, as before, rely on MI-6, the British secret service, and on Britain's ability to maintain good relations and good sources in Singapore?

Allen W. Dulles, then the C.I.A.'s director, decided to infiltrate the city with its own agents, to make sure that the British were sharing everything they knew. Although the decision was disputed, it is not uncommon in any intelligence service to bypass or double-check on an ally.

(On Vice President Humphrey's visit late last year to the capitals of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, Secret Service agents found at least three "bugs," or listening devices, hidden in his private quarters by one of his hosts.)

The agent who flew from Tokyo to Singapore was on a recruiting mission, and the lie detector, an instrument used by the C.I.A. on its own employes, was intended to test the reliability of a local candidate for a spy's job.

When the machine shorted out the lights in the hotel, the visiting agent, the would-be spy and another C.I.A. man were discovered. They wound up in a Singapore jail. There they were reported to have been "tortured" —either for real, or to extract a ransom.

The Price Was High

Secret discussions—apparently through C.I.A. channels—were held about the possibility of buying the agents' freedom with increased American foreign aid, but Washington eventually decided Singapore's price was too high. The men were subsequently released.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk —the Kennedy Administration had succeeded t- [illegible] ary, 1961—wrote a formal apology to Premier Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and promised to discipline the culprits.

That appeared to have ended the matter until last fall, when Premier Lee broke away from the Malaysian Federation and sought to establish himself for political reasons as more nearly a friend of Britain than of the United States, although his anti-Americanism was short of pro-Communism.

To help achieve this purpose, Mr. Lee disclosed the 1960 "affront" without giving any details, except to say that he had been offered a paltry $3.3-million bribe when he had demanded $33-million.

The State Department, which had been routinely fed a denial of wrongdoing by C.I.A. officials who did not know of the Rusk apology, described the charge as false. Mr. Lee then published Mr. Rusk's letter of 1961 and threatened also to play some interesting tape recordings for the press.

Hastily, Washington confessed —not to the bribe offer, which is hotly denied by all officials connected with the incident, or to the incident itself, but to having done *something* that had merited an apology.

London, infuriated in the first instance by what it considered the C.I.A.'s mistrust of MI-6, now fumed a second time about clumsy tactics in Washington.

Acting on Orders

Errors of bureaucracy and mishaps of chance can easily be found in the Singapore incident, but critics of the C.I.A. cannot easily find in it proof of the charges so often raised about the agency—"control," "making policy" and "undermining policy."

The agent in Singapore was acting on direct orders from Washington. His superiors in the C.I.A. were acting within the directives of the President and the National Security Council. The mission was not contrary to American foreign policy, was not undertaken to change or subvert that policy, and was not dangerously foolhardy. It was not much more than routine—and would not have been unusual in any intelligence service in the world.

Nevertheless, the Sinagpore incident — the details of which have been shrouded in the C.I.A.'s enforced secrecy—added greatly to the rising tide of dark suspicion that many people throughout the world, including many in this country, harbor about the agency and its activities.

Carl Rowan, the former director of the United States Information Agency and former Ambassador to Finland, wrote last year in his syndicated column that "during a recent tour of East Africa and Southeast Asia, it was made clear to me that suspicion and fear of the C.I.A. has become a sort of Achilles heel of American foreign policy."

President Sukarno of Indonesia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's Chief of State, Kenya, former President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and many other leaders have repeatedly insisted that behind the regular American government there is an "invisible government," the C.I.A., threatening them all with infiltration, subversion and even war. Communist China and the Soviet Union sound this theme endlessly.

"The Invisible Government" was the phrase applied to American intelligence agencies, and particularly the C.I.A., in a book of that title by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. It was a best-seller in the United States and among many government officials abroad.

Subject of Humor

So prevalent is the C.I.A. reputation of menace in so much of the world that even humorists have taken note of it. The New Yorker magazine last December printed a cartoon showing two natives of an unspecified country watching a vocano erupt. One native is saying to the other: "The C.I.A. did it. Pass the word."

In Southeast Asia, even the most rational leaders are said to be ready to believe anything about the C.I.A.

"Like Dorothy Parker and the things she said," one observer notes, "the C.I.A. gets credit or blame both for what it does and for many things it has not even thought of doing."

Many earnest Americans, too, are bitter critics of the C.I.A.

Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, has charged that the agency "is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress." He has introduced a proposal to create a special Foreign Relations subcommittee to make a "full and complete" study of the effects of C.I.A. operations on United States foreign relations.

Senator Stephen M. Young, Democrat of Ohio, has proposed that a joint Senate-House committee oversee the C.I.A. because, "wrapped in a cloak of secrecy, the C.I.A. has, in effect, been making foreign policy."

Mayor Lindsay of New York, while a Republican member of Congress, indicted the C.I.A. on the House floor for a long series of fiascos, including the most famous blunder in recent American history—the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Former President Harry S. Truman, whose Administration established the C.I.A. in 1947, said in 1963 that by then he saw "something about the way the C.I.A. has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic positions, and I feel that we need to correct it."

Kennedy's Bitterness

And President Kennedy, as the enormity of the Bay of Pigs disaster came home to him, said to one of the highest officials of his Administration that he wanted "to splinter the C.I.A. in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

Even some who defend the C.I.A. as the indispensable eyes and ears of the Government for example Allen Dulles, the agency's most famous director—now fear that the cumulative criticism and suspicion, at home and abroad, have impaired the C.I.A.'s effectiveness and therefore the nation's safety.

They are anxious to see the criticisms answered and the suspicions allayed, even if—in some cases—the agency should thus become more exposed to domestic politics and to compromises of security.

"If the establishment of a Congressional committee with responsibility for intelligence would quiet public fears and restore public confidence in the C.I.A.," Mr. Dulles said in an interview, "then I now think it would be worth doing despite some of the problems it would cause the agency."

Because this view is shared in varying degree by numerous friends of the C.I.A. and because its critics are virtually unanimous in calling for more "control," most students of the problem have looked to Congress for a remedy.

In the 19 years that the C.I.A. has been in existence, 150 resolutions for tighter Congressional control have been introduced—and put aside. The statistic in itself is evidence of widespread uneasiness about the C.I.A. and of how little is known about the agency.

For the truth is that despite the C.I.A.'s international reputation, few persons in or out of the American Government know much about its work, its organization, its supervision or its relationship to the other arms of the executive branch.

A former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for instance, had no idea how big the C.I.A. budget was. A Senator, experienced in foreign affairs, proved, in an interview, to know very little about, but to fear very much, its operations.

Many critics do not know that virtually all C.I.A. expenditures must be authorized in advance —first by an Administration committee that includes some of the highest-ranking political officials and White House staff assistants, then by officials in the Bureau of the Budget, who have the power to rule out or reduce an expenditure.

They do not know that, instead of a blank check, the C.I.A. has an annual budget of a little more than $500-million—only one-sixth the $3-billion the Government spends on its overall intelligence effort. The National Security Agency, a cryptographic and code-breaking operation run by the Defense Department, and almost never questioned by outsiders, spends twice as much as the C.I.A.

The critics shrug aside the fact that President Kennedy, after the most rigorous inquiry into the agency's affairs, methods and problems after the Bay of Pigs, did not "splinter" it after all and did not recommend Congressional supervision.

They may be unaware that since then supervision of intelligence activities has been tightened. When President Eisen- [illegible] letter to all Am-

"The C.I.A. did it. Pass it along."

Drawing by Alan Dunn; © 1965 The NewYorker Magazine, Inc.

THE C. I. A.—GOOD, BAD OR OTHERWISE? Much discussed and criticized, the Central Intelligence Agency has not escaped humorous treatment either. Its detractors loudly condemn it, nearly everyone talks about it, but very few really understand it.

bassadors placing them in charge of all American activities in their countries, he followed it with a secret letter specifically *exempting* the C.I.A.; but when President Kennedy put the Ambassadors in command of all activities, he sent a secret letter specifically *including* the C.I.A. It is still in effect but, like all directives, variously interpreted.

Out of a Spy Novel

The critics, quick to point to the agency's publicized blunders and setbacks, are not mollified by its genuine achievements — its precise prediction of the date on which the Chinese Communists would explode a nuclear device; its fantastic world of electronic devices; its use of a spy, Oleg Penkovskiy, to reach into the Kremlin itself; its work in keeping the Congo out of Communist control; or the feat —straight from a spy novel— of arranging things so that when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power in Egypt the "management consultant" who had an office next to the Arab leader's and who was one of his principal advisers was a C.I.A. operative.

When the U-2 incident is mentioned by critics, as it always is, the emphasis is usually on the C.I.A.'s — and the Eisenhower Administration's — blunder in permitting Francis Gary Powers's flight over the Soviet Union in 1960, just before a scheduled summit conference. Not much is usually said of the incalculable intelligence value of the undisturbed U-2 flights between 1956 and 1960 over the heartland of Russia.

And when critics frequently charge that C.I.A. operations contradict and sabotage official American policy, they may not know that the C.I.A. is often overruled in its policy judgments.

As an example, the C.I.A. strongly urged the Kennedy Administration not to recognize the Egyptian-backed Yemeni regime and warned that President Nasser would not quickly pull his troops out of Yemen. Ambassador John Badeau thought otherwise His advice was accepted, the republic was recognized, President Nasser's troops remained—and much military and political trouble followed that the C.I.A. had foreseen and the State Department had not.

Nor do critics always give the C.I.A. credit where it is due for its vital and daily service as an accurate and encyclopedic source of quick news, information, analysis and deduction about everything from a new police chief in Mozambique to an aid agreement between Communist China and Albania, from the state of President Sukarno's health to the meaning of Nikita S. Khrushchev fall from power.

Yet the critics' favorite indictments are spectacular enough to explain the world's suspicions and fears of the C.I.A. and its operations.

A sorry episode in Asia in the early ninteen-fifties is a frequently cited example. C.I.A. agents gathered remnants of the defeated Chinese Nationalist armies in the jungles of northwest Burma, supplied them with gold and arms and encouraged them to raid Communist China.

One aim was to harrass Peking to a point where it might retaliate against Burma, forcing the Burmese to turn to the United States for protection.

Actually, few raids occurred, and the army became a troublesome and costly burden. The C.I.A. had enlisted the help of Gen. Phao Sriyanod, the police chief of Thailand—and a leading narcotics dealer. The Nationalists, with the planes and gold furnished them by the agents, went into the opium business. By the time the "anti-Communist" force could be disbanded, and the C.I.A. could wash its hands of it, Burma had renounced American aid, threatened to quit the United Nations and moved closer to Peking.

Moreover, some of the Nationalist Chinese are still in northern Burma, years later, and still fomenting trouble and infuriating governments in that area, although they have not been supported by the C.I.A. or any American agency for a decade.

In 1958, a C.I.A.-aided operation involving South Vietnamese agents and Cambodian rebels was interpreted by Prince Sihanouk as an attempt to overthrow him. It failed but drove him farther down the road that ultimately led to his break in diplomatic relations with Washington.

Indonesian Venture

In Indonesia in the same year, against the advice of American diplomats, the C.I.A. was authorized to fly in supplies from Taiwan and the Philippines to aid army officers rebeling against President Sukarno in Sumatra and Java. An American pilot was shot down on a bombing mission and was released only at the insistent urging of the Kennedy Administration in 1962. Mr. Sukarno, naturally enough, drew the obvious conclusions; how much of his fear and dislike of the United States can be traced to those days is hard to say.

In 1960, C.I.A. agents in Laos,

disguised as "military advisers," stuffed ballot boxes and engineered local uprisings to help a hand-picked strongman, Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, set up a "pro-American" government that was desired by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

This operation succeeded—so much so that it stimulated Soviet intervention on the side of leftist Laotians, who counter-attacked the Phoumi government. When the Kennedy Administration set out to reverse the policy of the Eisenhower Administration, it found the C.I.A. deeply committed to Phoumi Nosovan and needed two years of negotiations and threats to restore the neutralist regime of Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Pro-Communist Laotians, however, were never again driven from the border of North Vietnam, and it is through that region that the Vietcong in South Vietnam have been supplied and replenished in their war to destroy still another C.I.A.-aided project, the non-Communist government in Saigon.

Catalogue of Charges

It was the C.I.A. that built up Ngo Dinh Diem as the pro-American head of South Vietnam after the French, through Emperor Bao Dai, had found him in a monastery cell in Belgium and brought him back to Saigon as Premier. And it was the C.I.A. that helped persuade the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to ride out the Vietnamese storm with Diem—probably too long.

These recorded incidents not only have prompted much soul-searching about the influence of an instrument such as the C.I.A. on American policies but also have given the C.I.A. a reputation for deeds and misdeeds far beyond its real intentions and capacities.

Through spurious reports, gossip, misunderstandings, deep-seated fears and forgeries and falsifications, the agency has been accused of almost anything anyone wanted to accuse it of.

It has been accused of:

¶Plotting the assassination of Jawaharlal Nehru of India.

¶Provoking the 1965 war between India and Pakistan.

¶Engineering the "plot" that became the pretext for the murder of leading Indonesia generals last year.

¶Supporting the rightist army plots in Algeria.

¶Murdering Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.

¶Kidnapping Moroccan agents in Paris.

¶Plotting the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

All of these charges and many similar to them are fabrications, authoritative officials outside the C.I.A. insist.

The C.I.A.'s notoriety even enables some enemies to recover from their own mistakes. A former American official unconnected with the agency recalls that pro-Chinese elements in East Africa once circulated a document urging revolts against several governments. When this inflammatory message backfired on its authors, they promptly spread the word that it was a C.I.A. forgery designed to discredit them—and some believed the falsehood.

Obvious Deduction

"Many otherwise rational African leaders are ready to take forgeries at face value," one observer says, "because deep down they honestly fear the C.I.A. Its image in this part of the world couldn't be worse."

The image feeds on the rankest of fabrications as well as on the wildest of stories—for the simple reason that the wildest of stories are not always false, and the C.I.A. is often involved and all too often obvious.

When an embassy subordinate in Lagos, Nigeria, known to be the C.I.A. station chief had a fancier house than the United States Ambassador, Nigerians made the obvious deduction about who was in charge.

When President João Goulart of Brazil fell from power in 1964 and C.I.A. men were accused of being among his most energetic opponents, exaggerated conclusions as to who had ousted him were natural.

It is not only abroad that such C.I.A. involvements — real or imaginery — have aroused dire fears and suspicions. Theodore C. Sorensen has written, for instance, that the Peace Corps in its early days strove manfully, and apparently successfully, to keep its ranks free of C.I.A. infiltration.

Other Government agencies, American newspapers and business concerns, charitable foundations, research institutions and universities have, in some cases, been as diligent as Soviet agents in trying to protect themselves from C.I.A. penetration. They have not always been so successful as the Peace Corps.

Some of their fear has been misplaced; the C.I.A. is no longer so dependent on clandestine agents and other institutions' resources. But as in the case of its overseas reputation, its actual activities in the United States—for instance, its aid in financing a center for international studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—have made the fear of infiltration real to many scholars and businesses.

The revelation that C.I.A. agents served among Michigan State University scholars in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959 has contributed to the fear. The nature of the agents' work and the circumstances of their employment are in dispute, but their very involvement, even relatively long ago, has aroused concern that hundreds of scholarly and charitable American efforts abroad will be tainted and hampered by the suspicions of other governments.

Thus, it is easy for sincere men to believe deeply that the C.I.A. must be brought "to heel" in the nation's own interest. Yet every well-informed official and former official with recent knowledge of the C.I.A. and its activities who was interviewed confirmed what Secretary of State Rusk has said publicly—that the C.I.A. "does not initiate actions unknown to the high policy leaders of the Government."

The New York Times survey left no doubt that, whatever its miscalculations, blunders and misfortunes, whatever may have been the situation during its bumptious early days and during its over-hasty expansion in and after the Korean War, the agency acts today not on its own but with the approval and under the control of the political leaders of the United States Government.

But that virtually undisputed fact raises in itself the central questions that emerge from the survey: What *is* control? And who guards the guards?

For it is upon information provided by the C.I.A. itself that those who must approve its activities are usually required to decide.

It is the C.I.A. that has the money (not unlimited but ample) and the talent (as much as any agency) not only to conceive but also to carry out projects of great importance—and commensurate risk.

Action, If Not Success

It is the C.I.A., unlike the Defense Department with its service rivalries, budget concerns and political involvements, and unlike the State Department with its international diplomatic responsibilities and its vulnerability to criticism, that is freest of all agencies to advocate its projects and press home its views; the C.I.A. can promise action, if not success.

And both the agency and those who must pass upon its plans are shielded by security from the outside oversight and review under which virtually all other officials operate, at home and abroad.

Thus, while the survey left no doubt that the C.I.A. operates under strict *forms* of control, it raised the more serious question whether there was always the *substance* of control.

In many ways, moreover, public discussion has become too centered on the question of control. A more disturbing matter may be whether the nation has allowed itself to go too far in the grim and sometimes deadly business of espionage and secret operations.

One of the best-informed men on this subject in Washington described that business as "ugly, mean and cruel." The agency loses men and no one ever hears of them again, he said, and when "we catch one of them" (a Soviet or other agent), it becomes necessary "to get everything out of them and we do it with no holds barred."

Secretary Rusk has said publicly that there is "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world." "It's a tough one, it's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely the other side," he said.

The back-alley struggle, he concluded, is "a never-ending war, and there's no quarter asked and none given."

'Struggle for Freedom'

But that struggle, Mr. Rusk insisted, is "part of the struggle for freedom."

No one seriously disputes that the effort to gain intelligence about real or potential enemies, even about one's friends, is a vital part of any government's activities, particularly a government so burdened with responsibility as the United States Government in the 20th century.

But beyond their need for information, how far should the political leaders of the United States go in approving the clandestine violation of treaties and borders, financing of coups, influencing of parties and governments, without tarnishing and retarding those ideas of freedom and self-government they proclaim to the world?

And how much of the secrecy and autonomy necessary to carry out such acts can or should be tolerated by a free society?

There are no certain or easy answers. But these questions cannot even be discussed knowledgeably on the basis of the few glimpses — accidental or intentional—that the public has so far been given into the private world of the C.I.A.

That world is both dull and lurid, often at the same time.

A year ago, for instance, it was reported that some of the anti-Castro Cuban survivors of the Bay of Pigs were flying in combat in deepest, darkest Africa. Any Madison Avenue publisher would recognize that as right out of Ian Fleming and James Bond.

But to the bookish and tweedy men who labor in the pastoral setting of the C.I.A.'s huge building on the banks of the Potomac River near Langley, Va., the story was only a satisfying episode in the back-alley version of "Struggle for Freedom."

How C.I.A. Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo

Intervention, Invasion, Spying All in a Day's Work

Following is the second of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other members of The Times staff.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25—At the Ituri River, eight miles south of Nia Nia in the northeast Congo, a government column of 600 Congolese troops and 100 white mercenaries had been ambushed by a rebel force and was under heavy fire. Suddenly, three B-26's skimmed in over the rain forest and bombed and strafed a path through the rebel ranks for the forces supported by the United States.

At the controls of the American-made planes were anti-Castro Cubans, veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, three years before. They had been recruited by a purportedly private company in Florida. Servicing their planes were European mechanics solicited through advertisements in London newspapers. Guiding them into action were American "diplomats" and other officials in apparently civilian positions.

The sponsor, paymaster and director of all of them, however, was the Central Intelligence Agency, with headquarters in Langley, Va. Its rapid and effective provision of an "instant air force" in the Congo was the climax of the agency's deep involvement there.

The C.I.A.'s operation in the Congo was at all times responsible to and welcomed by the policy-makers of the United States.

It was these policy-makers who chose to make the agency the instrument of political and military intervention in another nation's affairs, for in five years of strenuous diplomatic effort it was only in Langley that the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon found the peculiar combination of talents necessary to block the creation of a pro-Communist regime, recruit the leaders for a pro-American government and supply the advice and support to enable that government to survive.

From wire-tapping to influencing elections, from bridge-blowing to armed invasions, in the dark and in the light, the Central Intelligence Agency has become a vital instrument of American policy and a major component of American government.

It not only gathers information but also rebuts an adversary's information. It not only organizes its own far-flung operations but also resists an adversary's operation.

Against the Soviet Union alone, it performs not only certain of the services performed in Moscow by the K.G.B., the Committee for State Security, but also many of the political, intelligence and military services performed by pro-Soviet Communist parties around the world.

When the Communist and Western worlds began to wrestle for control of the vast, undeveloped Congo in 1960 after it had gained independence from Belgium, a modest little C.I.A. office in Leopoldville mushroomed overnight into a virtual embassy and miniature war department.

This was not to compete with the real United States Embassy and military attachés but to apply the secret, or at least discreet, capacities of the C.I.A. to a seething contest among many conflicting forces.

Starting almost from scratch, because the Belgians had forbidden Americans even to meet with Congolese officials, the C.I.A. dispersed its agents to learn Congolese politics from the bush on up, to recruit likely leaders and to finance their bids for power.

Capable of quickly gathering information from all sources, of buying informants and disburs-

Cont. Page 6

Reins Weighed

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25—A small group of Senators responsible for monitoring the Central Intelligence Agency met today to discuss whether their "watchdog" committee should be enlarged and its surveillance thightened.

The bipartisan group is made up of ranking members of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations subcommittee dealing with funds for the armed services.

For many years the Senate group and a comparable group in the House, also drawn from the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, have constituted the only "legislative oversight" of the secret operations and the secret funds of the C.I.A.

For many years also a large number of Senators and Representatives have urged that these two groups be expanded to include members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees so that the activities of the agency would be subjected more closely to political considerations.

Although Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the watchdog committee, has resisted these suggestions, in-

Cont. Page 9

ing funds without the bureaucratic restraints imposed on other government agencies, the C.I.A. soon found Joseph Mobutu, Victor Nendaka and Albert Ndele. Their eventual emergence as President of the country, Minister of Transportation and head of the national bank, respectively, proved a tribute to the Americans' judgment and tactics.

So pervasive was the C.I.A. influence that the agency was widely accused of the assassination of Moscow's man, Premier Patrice Lumumba. Correspondents who were in the Congo are convinced the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the murder, though it did play a major role in establishing Cyrille Adoula as Mr. Lumumba's successor for a time.

Money and shiny American automobiles, furnished through the logistic wizardry of Langley, are said to have been the deciding factors in the vote that brought Mr. Adoula to power. Russian, Czechslovak, Egyptian and Ghanaian agents were simply outbid where they could not be outmaneuvered.

In one test after Mr. Adoula had been elected, rival agents of East and West almost stumbled over each other rushing in and out of parliamentary delegates' homes. On the day of the roll-call, American and Czech representatives sat one seat apart in the gallery with lists of members, winking at each other in triumph whenever a man pledged to the one turned out to have been picked off by the other. Ultimately Mr. Adoula won by four votes.

More Than Money

By the Congo period, however, the men at Langley say they had learned that their earlier instincts to try to solve nasty political problems with money alone had been overtaken by the recognition of the need for far more sophisticated and enduring forms of influence.

"Purchased?" one American commented. "You can't even rent these guys for the afternoon."

And so the C.I.A. kept growing in size and scope.

By the time Moise Tshombe had returned to power in the Congo — through American acquiescence, if not design — it became apparent that hastily supplied arms and planes, as well as dollars and cars, would be needed to protect the American-sponsored government in Leopoldville.

This, apparently, was a job for the Defense Department, but to avoid a too obvious American involvement, and in the interests of speed and efficiency, the Government again turned to the C.I.A.

The agency had the tools. It knew the Cubans in Miami and their abilities as pilots. It had the front organizations through which they could be recruited, paid and serviced.

It could engage 20 British mechanics without legal complications and furnish the tactical expertise from its own ranks or from Americans under contract.

Moreover, some C.I.A. agents eventually felt compelled to fly some combat missions themselves in support of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries. The State Department denied this at first — then insisted the Americans be kept out of combat.

But it was pleased by the overall success of the operation, in which no planes were lost and all civilian targets were avoided.

Meanwhile, in Other Areas...

In the years of the Congo effort, the C.I.A. was also smuggling Tibetans in and out of Communist China, drawing secrets from Col. Oleg Penkovsky of Soviet military intelligence, spying on Soviet missile build-ups and withdrawals in Cuba, masterminding scores of lesser operations, analyzing the world's press and radio broadcasts, predicting the longevity of the world's major political leaders, keeping track of the world's arms traffic and of many arms manufacturing enterprises and supplying a staggering flow of information, rumor, gossip and analysis to the President and all major departments of government.

For all this, the C.I.A. employs about 15,000 persons and spends about a half billion dollars a year.

Its headquarters, the brain and nerve center, the information repository of this sprawling intelligence and operations system, is a modern, eight-story building of precast concrete and inset windows — a somewhat superior example of the faceless Federal style — set in 140 acres of lawn and woodland overlooking the south bank of the Potomac eight miles from downtown Washington.

In this sylvan setting, somewhat resembling an English deer park, about 8,000 C.I.A. employes — the top managers, the planners and the analysts —live, if not a cloistered life, at least a kind of academic one with the materials they are studying or the plans they may be hatching.

Formerly, the C.I.A. was scattered through many buildings in downtown Washington, which increased the problems and expense of security.

In the early nineteen-fifties, a $30-million appropriation for a new, unitary headquarters was inserted without identification in the budget of another agency—and promptly knocked out by a Congressional committee so befuddled by C.I.A. secrecy that it did not know what the item was for.

When Allen W. Dulles, then director of the C.I.A., came back in 1956 with more candor, he asked for $50,-million, and Congress gave him $46-million. He justified the bite that he proposed to take out of a 750-acre Government reservation on the Potomac by

tion, topography and heavy forestation" would provide the agency with the required security.

While the whitish-gray building is undoubtedly as secure as fences, guards, safes and elaborate electronic devices can make it, the location is hardly a secret. A large sign on the George Washington Parkway pointing to "Central Intelligence Agency" has been removed, but thousands of people know you can still get to the same building by turning off on the same road, now marked by the sign "BPR" — "Bureau of Public Roads."

There, beyond the affable guard at the gate, is the large, rectangular structure with four wings, the ground-level windows barred, which stands as the visible symbol of what is supposed to be an invisible operation.

For organizational purposes, C.I.A. headquarters is divided into four divisions, each under a deputy director — plans, intelligence, science and technology, and support.

What the Divisions Do

The Division of Science and Technology is responsible for keeping current on developing techniques in science and weapons, including nuclear weapons, and for analyzing photos taken by U-2 reconnaissance planes and by space satellites.

The Division of Support is responsible for procuring equipment and for logistics, communications and security, including the C.I.A. codes.

The Division of Plans and the Division of Intelligence perform the basic functions of the agency. They represent the alpha and omega, the hand and brain, the dagger and the lamp, the melodrama and the monograph of the intelligence profession. Their presence under one roof has caused much of the controversy that has swirled about the C.I.A. since the Bay of Pigs.

It is the responsibility of the Intelligence Division to assemble, analyze and evaluate information from all sources, and to produce daily and periodical intelligence reports on any country, person or situation for the President and the National Security Council, the President's top advisory group on defense and foreign policy.

All information — military, political, economic, scientific, industrial — is grist for this division's mill. Perhaps no more than one-fifth — by volume and not necessarily importance — comes from agents overseas under varying depths of cover.

Most information is culled from foreign newspapers, scientific journals, industry publications, the reports of other Government departments and intelligence services and foreign broadcasts monitored by C.I.A. stations around the world.

All Sorts of Experts

The Intelligence Division is organized by geographical sections that are served by resident

guists, chemists, physicists, biologists, geographers, engineers, psychiatrists and even agronomists, geologists and foresters.

Some of the achievements of these experts are prodigious, if reports filtering through the secrecy screen are even half accurate. For instance:

¶From ordinarily available information, reliable actuarial and life-expectancy studies have been prepared on major foreign leaders.

¶In the case of one leader, from not-so-ordinarily available information, physicians gleaned important health data: They made a urinalysis from a specimen stolen from a hospital in Vienna where the great man was being treated.

¶C.I.A. shipping experts, through sheer expertise, spotted the first shipment of Soviet arms to Cuba before the vessels had cleared the Black Sea.

¶Some anthropologists at C.I.A. headquarters devote their time to helpful studies of such minor — but strategically crucial — societies as those of the hill tribes of Laos and Vietnam.

¶One woman has spent her professional lifetime in the agency doing nothing but collecting, studying, collating, analyzing and reporting on everything that can be learned about President Sukarno of Indonesia — "and I mean everything," one official reported.

Heavy With Ph.D.'s

It is the agency's boast that it could staff any college from its analysts, 50 per cent of whom have advanced degrees and 30 per cent of whom have doctorates.

Sixty per cent of the Intelligence Division personnel have served 10 years. Twenty-five per cent have been with the C.I.A. since 1947, when the agency was established. The heaviest recruiting occurred during the Korean War — primarily, but by no means exclusively, among Ivy League graduates.

The Division of Plans is a cover title for what is actually the division of secret operations, or "dirty tricks." It is charged with all those stratagems and wiles — some as old as those of Rahab and some as new as satellites — associated with the black and despised arts of espionage and subversion.

The operations of the C.I.A. go far beyond the hiring and training of spies who seek out informers and defectors.

It was the Plans Division that set up clandestine "black" radio stations in the Middle East to counter the propaganda and the open incitements to revolution and murder by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Radio Cairo.

It was the Plans Division that masterminded the ouster of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, the overthrow of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 (two notable successes) and the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 (a resounding failure).

Among the triumphs of the Plans Division are the develop- high-altitude



Air Photographics, Inc.

HOME OF THE C.I.A.: Central Intelligence Agency has its headquarters at Langley, Va., near the Potomac River

May, 1960, when Francis Gary Powers was shot down by a Soviet rocket, photographed much of the Soviet Union; the digging of a tunnel into East Berlin from which C.I.A. agents tapped telephone cables leading to Soviet military headquarters in the acquisition of a copy of Premier Khrushcev's secret speech to the 20th party congress in 1956 denouncing Stalin's excesses and brutalities.

Liberals in the C.I.A.

The C.I.A. analysts of the Intelligence Division, in the opinion of many experts, are aware of the embedded antagonisms and frustrations of peoples just emerging into nationhood. Thus they are likely to be more tolerant than the activists in the Plans Division of the flamboyant nationalism and socialist orientation of the leaders in former colonies and more flexible than many of the State Department's cautious and legalistic diplomats.

In discussing the Portuguese territories of Angola of Mozambique, for example, the analysts are said to take the attitude that change is inevitable, that the United States has to deal with a pluralistic world. The State Department, on the other hand, tends to be diverted by Portuguese sensitivities and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization base in the Azores, also a Portugu

One State Department officer said that "there are more liberal intellectuals per square inch at C.I.A. than anywhere else in the government."

The operators and agents of the Plans Division, on the other hand, are described as more conservative in their economic outlook and more single-minded in their anti-Communism. This is particularly true of those engaged in deep-cover operations, many of whom are ex-military people or men formerly in the Office of Strategic Services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It has been said, however, that many of the agents who are essentially information gatherers and who work under transparent cover are as sophisticated as the analysts back home, and like them are sympathetic to the "anti-Communist left" in underdeveloped countries.

The C.I.A. agents abroad fall into two groups — both under the Plans Division.

First, there are those engaged in the really dirty business — the spies and counterspies, the saboteurs, the leaders of paramilitary operations, the suborners of revolution. Such agents operate under deepest cover, and their activities become known only when they are unfortunate enough to be caught and "surfaced" for political or propaganda purposes.

While such operatives may be known to "the chief of station" -- the top C.I.A. officer in any country — they are rarely known to the American Ambassador, although he may sometimes be aware of their mission. In fact, these deep agents are not known to the C.I.A.'s Intelligence Division in Washington, and their reports are not identified to it by name.

Correspondents of The New York Times say they have never, with certainty, been able to identify one of these agents, although they have on occasion run across some unaccountable American of whom they have had their suspicions. Often unknown to each other, the deep agents masquerade as businessmen, tourists, scholars, students, missionaries or charity workers.

Second, there are those agents, by far the larger number, who operate under the looser cover of the official diplomatic mission. In the mission register they are listed as political or economic officers, Treasury representatives, consular officers or employes of the Agency for International Development (the United States foreign aid agency) or United States Information Agency. The C.I.A. chief of station may be listed as a special assistant to the Ambassador or as the top political officer.

Not Very Secret

This official cover is so thin as to be meaningless except to avoid embarrassment for the host government. These agents usually are readily identifiable.

The chief of station is recognized as the man with a car as big as the Ambassador's and a house that is sometimes — as in Lagos, Nigeria — better.

In practically all the allied countries the C.I.A. agents identify themselves to host governments, and actually work in close cooperation with Cabinet officials, local intelligence and police.

In some embassies the C.I.A. agents outnumber the regular political and economic officers. In a few they have made up as much as 75 per cent of the diplomatic mission.

The chief of station often has more money than the Ambassador. Sometimes he has been in the country longer and is better informed than the Ambassador.

For all these reasons the host government, especially in underdeveloped areas of the world, may prefer to deal with the chief of station rather than the Ambassador, believing him to have readier access to top policy-making officials in Washington.

Top Quality People

Obviously the number of agents abroad is a closely held secret, kept from even such close Presidential advisers in the past as the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. In his book "A Thousand Days," Mr. Schlesinger states that those "under official cover overseas" number almost as many as State Department employes. This would be roughly 6,600. The actual number, however, is believed to be considerably less, probably around 2,200.

The secrecy of identification can lead to some amusing situations. Once when Allen Dulles, then C.I.A. director, visited New Delhi, every known "spook" (C.I.A. man) was lined up in an anteroom of the embassy to greet him. At that moment a newspaper correspondent who had been interviewing Mr. Dulles walked out of the inner office. A look of bewilderment crossed the faces of the C.I.A. men, plainly asking, "Is this one we didn't know about!

Mr. Schlesinger has written that "in some areas the C.I.A. had outstripped the State Department in the quality of its personnel."

Almost without exception, correspondents of The New York Times reported that the men at the top overseas were men of "high competence and discipline," "extremely knowing," "imaginative," "sharp and scholarly" and "generally somewhat better than those in State in work and dedication."

But they also found that below the top many C.I.A. people were "a little thin" and did not compare so favorably with Foreign Service officers on the same level.

The C.I.A. screens and rescreens applicants, because it is quite aware of the attraction that secrecy holds for the psychopath, the misfit and the immature person.

The greatest danger obviously lies in the area of special operations. Although it is generally agreed that the agents — overt and covert — have been for the most part men of competence and character, the C.I.A. has also permitted some of limited intelligence and of emotional instability to get through its screen and has even assigned them to sensitive tasks, with disastrous results.

One example was the assignment of a man known as "Frank Bender" as contact with Cuban exile leaders during the preliminaries of the Bay of Pigs operation. A German refugee with only a smattering of Spanish and no understanding of Latin America or Latin character, Bender antagonized the more liberal of the leaders by his bullying and his obvious partiality for the Cuban right.

Offices in This Country

The C.I.A. maintains field offices in 30 American cities. These offices are overt but discreet. Their telephone numbers are listed under "Central Intelligence Agency" or "United States Government," but no address is given. Anyone wanting the address must know the name of the office director, whose telephone number and address are listed.

At one time these field offices sought out scholars, businessmen, students and even ordinary tourists whom they knew to be planning a trip behind the Iron Curtain and asked them to record their observations and report to the C.I.A. on their return.

Very little of this assertedly is done any more, probably because of some embarrassing arrests and imprisonment of tourists and students. While the C.I.A. deals frankly with businessmen, it reputedly does not compromise their traveling representatives.

Most of the work of domestic field agents involves contacts with industry and universities. For example, an agent, on instructions from headquarters, will seek evaluation of captured equipment, analysis of the color of factory smoke as a clue to production, an estimate of production capacity from the size of a factory, or critiques of articles in technical and scientific journals.

The Human Inadequacy

In greater secrecy, the C.I.A. subsidizes, in whole or in part, a wide range of enterprises — "private" foundations, book and magazine publishers, schools of international studies in universities, law offices, "businesses" of various kinds and foreign broadcasting stations. Some of these perform real and valuable work for the C.I.A. Others ar not much more than "mail drops."

Yet all these human activities, all the value received and the dangers surmounted, all the organization and secrecy, all the trouble averted and all the setbacks encountered, still do not describe the work of the C.I.A. For the most gifted of analysts, the most crafty of agents — like all human beings — have their limitations.

At the time when the Americans were successfully keeping the Congo out of the Communist orbit, it still took the same men several months to slip an African agent into Stanleyville in the Congo to check on the lives and fate of some arrested Americans.

Men are fallible and limited, and the demands on the C.I.A. are almost infinite; that is why, today, some of the most valuable spies are not human and some of the most omnipotent agents hum through the heavens, and above.

Cont. from Page 5

formed sources said he called today's meeting precisely to consider such an expansion.

These sources said also that two recent disclosures of C.I.A. activities had apparently brought the whole issue to a head in the Senate watchdog group.

The first of these was the revelation that at least five C.I.A. agents operated in South Vietnam during the late 1950's under the cover of a multi-million dollar technical assistance program conducted for the government of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem by Michigan State University.

Intercedes in Suit

The second was the disclosure that the C.I.A. interceded in the slander trial of one of its agents, Juri Raus, an Estonian refugee, who was being sued by Eerik Heine, another Estonian emigre. Mr. Heine charged that Mr. Raus had publicly called him an agent of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

In a public memorandum addressed to the Federal Court in Baltimore, the C.I.A. said it had ordered Mr. Raus to cease testifying in order to protect the United States foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr. Raus claimed immunity on the ground that the alleged slander had been committed in the course of his C.I.A. duties.

Several days ago Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Senator Russell suggesting that they discuss the possibility of having representatives from his committee on the watchdog group. It could not be learned whether Mr. Russell has replied to this letter.

Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has expressed concern that the C.I.A. "is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress."

Mr. McCarthy has introduced a resolution calling for a "full and complete" study of the effect of C.I.A. operations on policymaking by a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. He also favors expanding the present oversight group to include members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Responsibility Cited

Today Mr. McCarthy said that, in view of the Michigan State and Raus cases, Congress would be rejecting "a very basic constitutional responsibility" if it did not begin "to exercise some degree of jurisdiction beyond what it is exercising now."

"Either the special group doesn't know about these things and it should, or it does know and tolerates them," Mr. McCarthy said.

Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Majority Leader, said with a smile that the proposal to widen the watchdog committee was "not a bad idea."

In 1954 Mr. Mansfield introduced a resolution to create a 12-man joint committee—six from each house—to maintain scrutiny on the C.I.A.

The resolution had 34 cosponsors. However, much of the support evaporated under the opposition of Senator Russell and Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, who agreed with the then C.I.A. director, Allen W. Dulles, that the joint committee might jeopardize security.

When the Mansfield resolution finally came to a vote in 1956, 14 sponsors reversed themselves, and it was defeated, 59 to 27.

Besides Mr. Russell and Mr. Saltonstall, the present watchdog committee is made up of Democrats John Stennis of Mississippi, Carl Hayden of Arizona, Stuart Symington of Missouri, and Republicans Milton R. Young of North Dakota and Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

C.I.A. Is Child of Pearl Harbor and Cold War

Japanese Attack Led to Its Start — Problems With Soviet Made It Grow

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25 — The Central Intelligence Agency traces its beginnings to the intelligence failure that made the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor possible. The agency owes its phenomenal growth to the cold war with the Soviet Union.

As a consequence of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt in June, 1942, established the Office of Strategic Services under Gen. William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan to supplement the intelligence-gathering of the military services. But the O.S.S., from the outset, also involved itself in such special operations as the parachuting of spies behind enemy lines.

Soon after V. J. Day, President Truman abolished the O.S.S. Four months later, in January, 1946, he created by executive order the National Intelligence Authority, composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and his personal military adviser, Adm. William D. Leahy. At the same time the President established a successor to the O.S.S. under the intelligence authority. The new organization was called the Central Intelligence Group.

C.I.A. Created in 1947

Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers was the first head of the Central Intelligence Group. He remained only five months. He was succeeded by Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg of the Air Force who gave way in May, 1947, to Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter.

The C.I.A. was established by the National Security Act of 1947, which placed the armed services under a new Department of Defense and created the National Security Council.

The act gave the C.I.A. the following five duties:

¶To advise the National Security Council on intelligence matters.

¶To make recommendations for intelligence coordination.

¶To correlate and evaluate intelligence and disseminate it within the Government.

¶To perform for the existing intelligence agencies "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."

¶To perform "such other functions and duties related to intelligence" as the security council would direct.

Congress also directed that the other intelligence agencies should remain in business, that the C.I.A. director should be responsible for guarding secrets, and that the agency should have "no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions."

In 1949, the agency's cloak of secrecy was firmly buttoned up against inquiry by the standing committees of Congress. In the Central Intelligence Agency Act, Congress allowed the agency to do the following:

¶Disregard laws that required "disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the agency."

¶Expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures, and with no other accounting than the director's vouchers.

¶Make contracts and purchases without advertising.

¶Transfer funds to and from other Government agencies.

Contract for research outside the Government.

¶Provide special expense allowances for staff abroad.

¶Admit up to 100 aliens and members of their families a year.

Hillenkoetter Given Charge

However, the specifics of the 1947 and 1949 legislation are not the only basis for the agency's operations. Under that legislation, the National Security Council is permitted to issue directives to the C.I.A. Director, and it is under such secret directives—often proposed by the Director himself — that the agency engages in many of its activities.

Admiral Hillenkoetter was director of the new agency for its first three years. His successor was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, World War II Chief of Staff to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. General Smith served until Feb. 10, 1953, when Allen W. Dulles was made director. Mr. Dulles remained until September, 1961.

President Kennedy selected as his successor John A. McCone, who had been Under Secretary of the Air Force during the first two years of the Korean War and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission during the last three years of the Eisenhower Administration.

Coordinating Agency

Mr. McCone served until April 28, 1965, surrendering his responsibilities to Adm. William F. Raborn on the day President Johnson decided to send Marines into the Dominican Republic.

The responsibilities and powers of the Director of the C.I.A. reach far beyond those of his own agency. By statute he also has the title of Director of Central Intelligence, and as such he is responsible for the whole "intelligence community," which encompasses nine other departments and agencies.

Representatives of these agencies sit on a United States Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the C.I.A. director. The C.I.A.'s representative on this board is the Deputy Director, now Richard M. Helms, who was an O.S.S. officer during World War II, stayed on in the C.I.A., and succeeded Richard M. Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans after the Bay of Pigs disaster.

Next to the C.I.A., the largest and most important members of the intelligence community are the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The National Security Agency which was established by Presidential directive in 1952, is charged chiefly with the construction of codes for the United States and the breaking of the codes of enemy, allied and neutral nations. Its headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., is stuffed with electronic equipment and computers, and it has radio intercept stations throughout the world.

The operations, number of personnel and budget of the National Security Agency are secrets even more closely held than those of the C.I.A. But the code agency's annual expenditures, because of its costly equipment, have been estimated at twice that of C.I.A., or roughly $1-billion a year.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, set up in October, 1961, is responsible for coordinating conflicting intelligence of three services—Army G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence and Air Force A-2. The Defense Intelligence Agency also produces for the (United States Intelligence Board) the official intelligence estimate of the Department of Defense.

Representatives of the services sit on the Intelligence Board. Also represented on the Board is the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This is an analysis, and not a collecting agency, and is principally concerned that foreign policy considerations are given due weight. The State Department bureau has about 300 employes and a budget of about $4.5-million.

The Atomic Energy Commission, which is responsible for the various devices, including air sampling and seismic instruments, for detecting nuclear tests by other nations, is also on the Intelligence Board.

The final member of the community is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose Division 5 is responsible for catching domestic spies.

C.I.A. Spies From 100 Miles Up; Satellites Probe Secrets of Soviet

Electronic Prying Grows

Following is the third of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other Times staff members.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 26 — To the men most privy to the secrets of the Central Intelligence Agency, it sometimes seems that the human spies, the James Bonds and Mata Haris, are obsolete. Like humans everywhere, they are no match for the computers, cameras, radars and other gadgets by which nations can now gather the darkest secrets of both friends and foes.

With complex machines circling the earth at 17,000 miles an hour, C.I.A. agents are able to relax in their carpeted offices beside the Potomac and count the intercontinental missiles poised in Soviet Kazakhstan, monitor the conversations between Moscow and a Soviet submarine near Tahiti, follow the countdown of a sputnik launching as easily as that of a Gemini capsule in Florida, track the electronic imprint of an adversary's bombers and watch for the heat traces of his missiles.

Only a half dozen years ago, at least one human pilot was still required to guide a black U-2 jet across the Soviet Union from Pakistan to Norway, or over Cuba or Communist China from bases in Florida and Taiwan.

His cameras and listening devices, capable of picking out a chalk line or a radar station from 15 miles up, were incredible in their day, the product of imaginative C.I.A. research and developments. But spies in the sky now orbiting the earth do almost as well from 100 miles up.

Cosmic Espionage

Already, the United States and the Soviet Union are vying with each other in cosmic spying. American Samos and Soviet Cosmos satellites gather more data in one 90-minute orbit than an army of earthbound spies.

Other gadgets of the missile age have taken over the counterspy function. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara gave a Congressional committee a strong hint about that last year when he mentioned "inspection of orbiting objects in the satellite interceptor Thor program as well as in the two large ground-based optical programs at Cloudcroft, N. M."

His testimony suggested that the United States could orbit a satellite capable of photographing and otherwise "inspecting" Soviet space spies, while other equipment could photograph them from the ground with remarkable detail.

Such electronic eyes, ears, noses and nerve ends — and similar ones aboard ships and submarines — are among the nation's most vital secrets. They are not exclusively the property or inspiration of the C.I.A.

C.I.A. cameras and other snooping equipment are riding in spacecraft that are otherwise the responsibility of the Defense Department.

No clear breakdown of responsibilities and cost is available, but, altogether, the annual cost of the United States' intelligence effort exceeds $3-billion a year — more than six times the amount specifically allocated to the C.I.A. and more than 2 per cent of the total Federal budget.

Bugging From Afar

Not all the gadgetry is cosmic. The agency is now developing a highly sensitive device that will pick up from afar indoor conversations, by recording the window vibrations caused by the speakers' voices.

This is only one of many nefarious gadgets that have made the word "privacy" an anachronism. It is possible, for instance, with equipment so tiny as to be all but invisible, to turn the whole electric wiring system of a building into a quivering transmitter of conversation taking place anywhere within.

Picking up information is one thing; getting it "home" and doing something with it is another. Some satellites, for instance, are rigged to emit capsules bearing photos and other readings; as they float to earth by parachute, old C-130 aircraft dash across the Pacific from Hawaii and snare the parachutes with long, dangling, trapeze-like cables. The planes have a 70 per cent catching average.

Sometimes the intelligence wizards get carried away by their imaginations. Several years ago they spent tens of millions of dollars on the construction of a 600-foot radio telescope designed to eavesdrop on the Kremlin. It was to pick up radio signals, such as those emitted when a Soviet Premier called his chauffeur by radiotelephone, as they bounced off the moon.

The project turned into an engineering fiasco, but technology came to the rescue by providing "ferret" satellites that can tune in on the same short-range radio signals as they move straight up to the ionosphere.

Overlooking the rights of territorial sovereignty and national and human privacy, officials throughout the United States Government praise the C.I.A.'s gadgetry as nothing short of "phenomenal." The atmosphere everywhere, they say, is full of information, and the objective of a technological intelligence service is to gather and translate it into knowledge.

At C.I.A. hedquarters in Langley, Va., other intricate machines, some unknown a decade or even a few years ago, read, translate, interpret, collate, file and store the information. Sometimes months or years later, the data can be retrieved from tens of millions of microfilmed categories.

This effort has paid off monumentally, according to those who know most about it.

It was aerial reconnaissance by the U-2 spy plane — succeeded in many ways by satellites in 1961 — that enabled Washington to anticipate and measure the Soviet Union's capacity to produce missiles in the nineteen-fifties. These estimates, in turn, led to the so-called "missile gap," which became a prime political issue in the 1960 Presidential campaign. But it was also the U-2 that later produced proof that the Russians were not turning out missiles as fast as they could, thus dispelling the "missile gap" from Washington's thinking and jargon.

Still later, C.I.A. devices discovered missiles being emplaced underground in the Soviet Union. U-2's spotted the preparation of missile sites in Cuba in 1962. They also sampled the radioactive fallout of Soviet nuclear tests in 1961. Highly secret techniques, including aerial reconnaissance, allowed the C.I.A. to predict the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 with remarkable accuracy.

Purloined Messages

Countless conversations and messages the world over have been purloined; even subtler signals and indications, once detected by the marvels of science, can be read and combined into information of a kind once impossible to obtain.

The first duty of the C.I.A. is to collect, interpret and disseminate what it learns from

Cont. Page 12

M.I.T. Cuts Agency Ties

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 26— The Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology disclosed today that it would "reluctantly" sever connections with the Central Intelligence Agency at the end of June.

The agency helped to establish the center with a $300,000 grant in 1951 and since then has supported much of its research, mostly in Communist affairs.

A spokesman for the center said it was decided a year ago that, "for practical and not moral reasons," no further contracts should be accepted from the C.I.A. Although the work supported by agency funds has done much good and has involved nothing improper, the relationship had been "misunderstood" and has "caused sufficient difficulty," he said.

Existing contracts are being allowed to run their course but no further work will be performed with the agency's support after July 1, the spokesman said.

In its early years, the center performed a great deal of research work for the intelligence agency, supplying analyses of events and trends in the Communist world but insisting upon the right to publish the results of the work. In recent years, after faculty members and others criticized the arrangement, the number of C.I.A. projects is said to have been sharply restricted.

In the last two or three years, the spokesman said, the agency contributed no more than 15 per cent, or $112,500, of the center's $750,000 budget. The exact amounts are classified as secret by the agency, he said.

One early beneficiary of the agency's support was a research team on Soviet affairs headed by Prof. Walt W. Rostow, who later became chairman of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department and is now a special assistant to President Johnson.

Prof. Max Millikan, an assistant director of the intelligence agency in 1951-52, has been director of the center since 1952.

The authorities at M.I.T. have tried in recent days to make clear that they have not conducted any overseas operations and that the center's work in India and other nations to help promote economic development has not been supported by the intelligence agency.

Cont. Page 15

its worldwide nerve system — weaving together, into the "intelligence" the government needs, every electronic blip, squeak, and image and the millions of other items that reach its headquarters from more conventional, often public, sources: random diplomatic contacts, press clippings, radio monitor reports, books and research projects and eyewitness evidence. (Even some of these "open" sources, such as a regional newspaper from Communist China, must be smuggled or bought at a stiff price.)

Every hour of every day, about 100 to 150 fresh items of news, gossip and research reach the C.I.A.'s busy headquarters in Virginia and are poured into the gigantic human-and-technological computer that its analysis section resembles.

Four of every five of these items, it is said, now come either from "open" sources or inanimate devices. But in many important instances it is still the human agent, alerted to make a particular arrangement or to chase a specific piece of information, who provides the link that makes all else meaningful and significant; sometimes, now as in the 18th century, it is men alone who do the job in danger and difficulty.

When it was discovered, for instance, that Premier Khrushchev had shaken the Communist world with a secret speech denouncing Stalin in 1956, it was a C.I.A. agent who finally came up with the text, somewhere in Poland, and other analysts who determined that it was genuine.

A Rebellion Hastened

This feat of numan spying in an electronic age yielded vital information and, leaked to the press in Europe and elsewhere, hastened the anti-Stalin rebellions in many Communist countries and probably contributed to upheavals in Poland and Hungary that are still among the heaviest liabilities of Communist history.

It takes a sub-agent in Tibet, personally recruited by a C.I.A. man there and paid either a retainer or by the piece, to deliver a sheaf of secret army documents circulating among regimental commanders of Communist China's People's Liberation Army.

Only his counterpart in Algeria can provide some drawings of the design of the interior of Peking's embassy (although such designs can often be obtained with no more effort than asking for them at the offices of the American who constructed the building).

And beyond this large remaining value of the human being in the humming world of espionage, it is also the human brain in the C.I.A. that gives information its real importance by supplying interpretations for the President and his men.



Defense Dept.

DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: This Soviet freighter was photographed after leaving Cuba on Nov. 6, 1962, carrying on deck one of the missiles the Soviet Union withdrew under intense pressure from the U.S. It was C.I.A. efforts that originally uncovered the presence of Soviet missiles on the island that led to diplomatic showdown.

The end product is a series of papers, handsomely printed and often illustrated with fancy maps to gain a bureaucratic advantage over rival pieces of paper from other agencies.

The agency produces intelligence reports almost hourly, and sweeping summaries every day. It provides a special news report for President Johnson's nightly bedtime reading, sometimes containing such juicy tidbits as the most recent playboy activities of the indefatigable President Sukarno of Indonesia.

A C.I.A. Press Conference

More elaborate reports and projections are prepared on such matters as the rate of Soviet economic growth.

The State Department has sometimes published these, without credit to their origin. Piqued by these announcements, the C.I.A. called its first news conference in 1964 to put out the latest readings on Soviet prosperity. The idea of the "spooks," as C.I.A. men are called, summoning reporters caused so much amusement in Washington—and perhaps displeasure in other agencies—that the C.I.A. has never held another news conference.

Still more important subjects, such as Soviet nuclear capabilities or Communist Chinese intentions in Southeast Asia, are dealt with in formal national intelligence estimates. These encompass all information available on a given subject and reflect the final judgment of the Board of National Estimates, a group of 14 analysts in the C.I.A.

National estimate intelligence is intended to reach a definite conclusion to guide the President. But as other departments are consulted and the various experts express their views, their disagreements, caveats and dissents are noted and recorded by footnotes in the final document. These signs of dispute are likely to herald important uncertainties, and some officials believe the footnotes to be the best-read lines of all the millions committed to paper in the Government every month.

The C.I.A. also produces rapid analyses and predictions on request — say, about the likelihood of the Soviet Union's going to war over the Cuban missile crisis, or about the consequences of different courses of action contemplated at a particular moment by the United States in Vietnam.

How Good Are the Reports?

How effective these reports have been, and how well they are heeded by the policy-makers, are questions of lively debate in the intelligence community.

In recent years, the C.I.A. is generally believed to have been extremely good in furnishing information about Soviet military capabilities and orders of battle, about the Chinese nuclear weapons program and, after constant goading from the White House, about the progress of India, the United Arab Republic, Israel and other nations toward a capacity to build nuclear weapons.

Reports from inside Indonesia, Algeria and the Congo during recent fast-moving situations are also said to have been extremely good.

On the other hand, the C.I.A. has been criticized for not having known more in advance about the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, about the divorce of the United Arab Republic and Syria in 1961, about the political leanings of various leaders in the Dominican Republic and about such relatively public matters as party politics in Italy.

Some — including Dwight D. Eisenhower — have criticized the agency for not having recognized in time Fidel Castro's Communist leanings or the possibility that the Soviet Union would ship missiles to Cuba.

Almost everyone, however, generally concedes the necessity for gathering intelligence to guide the Government in its worldwide involvements. Criticism goes beyond the value or

accuracy of C.I.A. reports. For information-gathering often spills over at the scene of action into something else — subversion, counteractivity, sabotage, political and economic intervention and other kinds of 'dirty tricks." Often the intelligence gatherer, by design or force of circumstance, becomes an activist in the affairs he was set to watch.

On-the-Scene Action

C.I.A. analysts reading the punchcards of their computers in Virginia can determine that a new youth group in Bogota appears to have fallen under the control of suspected Communists, but it takes an agent on the spot to trade information with the local police, collect photographs and telephone taps of those involved, organize and finance a countermovement of, say, young Christians or democratic labor youth, and help them erect billboards and turn mimeograph machines at the next election.

Dozens — at times hundreds — of C.I.A. men have been employed on Taiwan to train men who will be smuggled into Communist China and to interview defectors and refugees who come out; to train Chinese Nationalists to fly the U-2; to identify and befriend those who will move into power after the departure of the Nationalists' President, Chiang Kai-shek; to beam propaganda broadcasts at the mainland; to organize harrassing operations on the islands just off the shore of the mainland, and to provide logistic support for other C.I.A. operations in Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia.

In these and dozens of other instances, an agent who is merely ostensibly gathering intelligence is in reality an activist attempting to create or resolve a situation.

Because a great many such activists are also in the field for a variety of purposes other than open or clandestine information gathering, the involvement of fallible human beings in the most dangerous and murky areas of C.I.A. operations causes most of the agency's failures and difficulties and gives it its fearsome reputation.

Men, by and large, can control machines but not events, and not always themselves. It was not, after all, the shooting down of a U-2 inside the Soviet Union in 1960 that caused worldwide political repercussions and a Soviet-American crisis; each side could have absorbed that in some sort of "cover." It was rather the Soviet capture of a living American pilot, Francis Gary Powers, that could not be explained away and that Russians did not want explained away.

But the C.I.A. invariably develops an interest in its projects and can be a formidable advocate in the Government.

When it presented the U-2 program in 1956, fear of detection and diplomatic repercussions led the Eisenhower Administration to run some "practice" missions over Eastern Europe. The first mission to the Soviet Union, in mid-1956, over Moscow and Leningrad, was detected but not molested. It did, however, draw the first of a number of secret diplomatic protests.

After six missions the Administration halted the flights, but the C.I.A pressed for their resumption. Doubts were finally overcome, and 20 to 25 more flights were conducted, with Soviet fighter planes in vain pursuit of at least some of them.

The Powers plane is thought to have been crippled by the nearby explosion of an antiaircraft missile developed with the U-2's in mind.

Risky and Often Profitable

The simplest and most modest of these risky, often profitable, sometimes disastrous human efforts are reported to be carried out in the friendly nations of Western Europe.

In Britain, for instance, C.I.A. agents are said to be little more than contact men with British intelligence, with British Kremlinologists and other scholars and experts.

With MI-6, its London counterpart, the C.I.A. compares notes and divides responsibilities on targets of mutual interest. The agency, having come a painful cropper in Singapore a few years ago, now leaves spying in Malaysia, for instance, to the old Commonwealth sleuths while probably offering in return the C.I.A.'s copious material from Indonesia.

Generally cooperative arrangements also prevail in countries such as Canada and Italy and, to a somewhat lesser degree, in France. In West Germany, a major cold-war battleground, the C.I.A. is much more active.

The C.I.A. runs an office in Bonn for general coordination. Another in Berlin conducts special activities such as the famous wiretap tunnel under East Berlin, a brilliant technical hookup that eavesdropped on Soviet Army headquarters. It was exposed in 1956 when East German workmen, digging on another project, struck a weak spot in the tunnel and caused it to collapse.

A C.I.A. office in Frankfurt supervises some of the United States' own espionage operations against the Soviet Union, interviews defectors and recruits agents for service in Communist countries.

In Munich, the C.I.A. supports a variety of research groups and such major propaganda outlets as Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, aimed at the Soviet Union.

Jobs for Refugees

Besides entertaining and informing millions of listeners in Communist nations, these nominally "private" outlets provide employment for many gifted and knowledgeable refugees from Russia, Poland, Hungary and other countries.

They also solicit the services of informers inside the Communist world, monitor Communist broadcasts, underwrite anti-Communist lectures and writings by Western intellectuals and distribute their research materials to scholars and journalists in all continents.

But there is said to be relatively little direct C.I.A. spying upon the United States' allies. Even in such undemocratic countries as Spain and Portugal, where more independent C.I.A. activity might be expected, the operation is reliably described as modest.

The American agency has a special interest, for instance, in keeping track in Spain of such refugees from Latin America as Juan Perón of Argentina. Nevertheless, it relies so heavily on the information of the Spanish police that American newspapermen are often a better source for American Embassy officials than the C.I.A. office.

In much of Africa, too, despite the formidable reputation it has among governments, the C.I.A. takes a back seat to the intelligence agencies of the former colonial nations, Britain and France, and concentrates on gathering information about Soviet, Chinese and other Communist efforts there. (The Congo has been the major exception. The agency compiles lists of travelers to Moscow, Prague or Peking, attempts to infiltrate their embassies and checks on arms and aid shipments through African airfields.

An Eye on Potential Rebels

The agency is thought to have attempted to infiltrate the security services of some African countries but only with mixed success. It gathers special dossiers on the activities of various nationalist and liberation movements and befriends opposition leaders in such countries as Algeria and the United Arab Republic, in the hope that it can predict upheavals or at least be familiar with new rulers if their bids for power are successful.

The C.I.A., long in advance, had information on the plan by which Algerian Army officers overthrew Ahmed Ben Bella last June — but it did not know the month in which the officers would make their move, and it had nothing to do with plotting or carrying out the coup.

Thanks to contacts with Gamal Abdel Nasser before he seized power in Egypt, the C.I.A. had almost intimate dealings with the Nasser government before the United States drew his ire by reneging on its promised aid to build the Aswan Dam.

Some of these Egyptian ties lingered even through the recent years of strained relations. Through reputed informants like Mustafa Amin, a prominent Cairo editor, the C.I.A. is said in the United Arab Republic to have obtained the details of a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal in 1964 and other similar information. Thus, Amin's arrest last fall may have closed some important channels and it gave the United Arab Republic the opportunity to demand greater American aid in return for playing down its "evidence" of C.I.A. activity in Cairo.

The C.I.A.'s talent for secret warfare is known to have been tested twice in Latin America. It successfully directed a battle of "liberation" against the leftist government of Col. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. Seven years later, a C.I.A.-sponsored army jumped off from secret bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua for the disastrous engagement at Cuba's Bay of Pigs.

Promoter of Fronts

Not so melodramatically, the agency runs dozens of other operations throughout the hemisphere.

It provides "technical assistance" to most Latin nations by helping them establish anti-Communist police forces. It promotes anti-Communist front organizations for students, workers, professional and business men, farmers and political parties. It arranges for contact between these groups and American labor organizations, institutes and foundations.

It has poured money into Latin-American election campaigns in support of moderate candidates and against leftist leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana.

It spies upon Soviet, Chinese and other Communist infiltrators and diplomats and attempts to subvert their programs. When the C.I.A. learned last year that a Brazilian youth had been killed in 1963, allegedly in an auto accident, while studying on a scholarship at the Lumumba University in Moscow, it mounted a massive publicity campaign to discourage other South American families from sending their youngsters to the Soviet Union.

In Southeast Asia over the past decade, the C.I.A. has been so active that the agency in some countries has been the principal arm of American policy.

It is said, for instance, to have been so successful at infiltrating the top of the Indonesian government and army that the United States was reluctant to disrupt C.I.A. covering operations by withdrawing aid and information programs in 1964 and 1965. What was presented officially in Washington as toleration of President Sukarno's insults and provocations was in much larger measure a desire to keep the C.I.A. fronts

in business as long as possible.

Though it is not thought to have been involved in any of the maneuvering that has curbed President Sukarno's power in recent months, the agency was well poised to follow events and to predict the emergence of anti-Communist forces.

Links to Power

After helping to elect Ramón Magsaysay as president of the Philippines in 1953, buttressing the family government of Ngo Dinh iDem and Ngo Dinh Nhu in South Vietnam in 1954 and assisting in implanting the regime of the strong-man Phoumi Nosavan in Laos in 1960, the C.I.A. agents responsible obviously became for long periods much more intimate advisers and effective links to Washington than the formally designated American Ambassadors in those countries.

And when the Kennedy administration came into office in 1961, the President concluded that the C.I.A. had so mortgaged American interests to Phoumi Nosavan that there was at first no alternative to dealing with him.

Moreover, the C.I.A.'s skill at moving quickly and in reasonable secrecy drew for it many assignments in Southeast Asia that would normally be given to the Defense Department. It was able, for instance, to fly supplies to the Meo tribesmen in Laos to help them fight against the pro-Communist Pathet Lao at a time when treaty obligations forbade the assignment of American military advisers to the task.

In South Vietnam, the C.I.A.'s possession of energetic young men with political and linguistic talents proved much more successful in wresting mountain and jungle villages from Communist control than the Pentagon's special forces.

But the C.I.A. was also deeply committed to the Ngo brothers and was tricked by them into supporting their private police forces. These were eventually employed against the Buddhist political opposition, thus provoking the coup d'état by military leaders in 1963 that brought down the Ngos.

In Thailand, the C.I.A. has now begun a program of rural defense against Communist subversion. Working through foreign aid offices and certain airlines, agents are working with hill tribes along the Burmese and Laos borders and helping to build a provincial police network along the borders of Laos and Cambodia.

Furtive Operations

Few Americans realize how such operations as these may affect innocent domestic situations — the extent to which the dispatch of a planeload of rice by a subsidized carrier, Air America, in Laos causes the agency to set furtive operations in motion within the United States.

When Air America or any other false-front organization has run into financial difficulties, the agency has used its influence in Washington and throughout the United States to drum up some legitimate sources of income.

Unknown to most of the directors and stockholders of an airline, for instance, the C.I.A. may approach the leading officials of the company, explain its problem and, come away with some profitable air cargo contracts.

In other domestic offshoots of the C.I.A.'s foreign dealings, American newspaper and magazine publishers, authors and universities are often the beneficiaries of direct or indirect C.I.A. subsidies.

A secret transfer of C.I.A. funds to the State Department or United States Information Agency, for example, may help finance a scholarly inquiry and publication. Or the agency may channel research and propaganda money through foundations—legitimate ones or dummy fronts.

The C.I.A. is said to be behind the efforts of several foundations that sponsor the travel of social scientists in the Communist world. The vast majority of independent foundations have warned that this practice casts suspicion on all traveling scholars, and in the last year the C.I.A. is said to have curtailed these activities somewhat.

$400,000 for Research

Congressional investigation of tax-exempt foundations in 1964 showed that the J. M. Kaplan Fund, Inc., among others, had disbursed at least $400,000 for the C.I.A. in a single year to a research institute This institute, in turn, financed research centers in Latin America that drew other support from the Agency for International Development (the United States foreign aid agency), the Ford Foundation and such universities as Harvard and Brandeis.

Among the Kaplan Fund's other previous contributors there had been eight funds or foundations unknown to experts on tax-exempt charitable organizations. Five of them were not even listed on the Internal Revenue Service's list of foundations entitled to tax exemption.

Through similar channels, the C.I.A. has supported groups of exiles from Cuba and refugees from Communism in Europe, or anti-Communist but liberal organizations of intellectuals such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and some of their newspapers and magazines.

Encounter magazine, a well-known anti-Communist intellectual monthly with editions in Spanish and German as well as English, was for a long time — though it is not now — one of the indirect beneficiaries of C.I.A. funds. Through arrangements that have never been publicly explained, several American book publishers have also received C.I.A. subsidies.

An even greater amount of C.I.A. money apparently was spent on direct, though often secret, support of American scholars. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology opened a Center of International Studies with a grant of $300,000 from the C.I.A. in 1951 and continued to take agency funds until the link was exposed, causing great embarrassment to M.I.T.'s scholars working in India and other countries.

The agency's support for M.I.T. projects gradually dwindled, but the fear of compromising publicity led the university to decide a year ago to accept no new C.I.A. contracts.

Similar embarrassment was felt at Michigan State University after the recent disclosure that C.I.A. agents had served on its payroll in a foreign-aid project in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959. The university contended that no secret intelligence work was done by the agents, but it feared that a dozen other overseas projects now under way would be hampered by the suspicions of other governments.

The C.I.A. was among the first Government agencies to seek the valuable services of American scholars — an idea now widely emulated. Many scholars continue to serve the agency as consultants, while others work on research projects frankly presented to their superiors as C.I.A. assignments.

At a meeting of the American Political Science Foundation here last fall, however, at least two speakers said too many scholars were still taking on full-time intelligence services. They also warned that the part-time activities of others could influence their judgments or reputations.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty provide cover for C.I.A.-financed organizations that draw upon the research talents of American scholars and also service scholars with invaluable raw material. The Free Europe Committee even advertises for public contributions without revealing its ties to the United States Government.

Radio Swan, a C.I.A. station in the Caribbean that was particularly active during the Bay of Pigs invasion, maintains unpublicized contacts with private American broadcasters.

The C.I.A. at times has addressed the American people directly through public relations men and nominally independent citizens committees. Many other C.I.A.-run fronts and offices, however, exist primarily to gather mail from and to provide credentials for its overseas agents.

Thus, the ramifications of C.I.A. activities, at home and abroad, seem almost endless. Though satellites, electronics and gadgets have taken over much of the sheer drudgery of espionage, there remains a deep involvement of human beings, who project the agency into awkward diplomatic situations, raising many issues of policy and ethics.

That is why many persons are convinced that in the C.I.A. a sort of Frankenstein's monster has been created that no one can fully control.

By its clandestine nature, the C.I.A. has few opportunities to explain, justify or defend itself. It can don the cloak of secrecy and label all its works as necessary to further some "national interest." And it can quietly lobby for support inside the Government and among influential members of Congress and with the President.

But a "national interest" that is not a persuasive defense to men who have their own ideas of the "national interest" — along with secrecy itself — has the inevitable effect of convincing critics that the agency has plenty to hide besides its codebooks.

The imaginations and consciences of such critics are certainly not set at rest when they learn, for instance, that in 1962 an outraged President Kennedy — obviously differing with the agency about the "national interest" — forced the C.I.A. to undo a particularly clumsy piece of sabotage that might have blackened the nation's name all around the world.

Cont. from Page 11

Some "confusion" was caused, the spokesman explained, by the disclosure that at least five C.I.A. agents worked among Michigan State University scholars on a foreign aid project in South Vietnam from 1955 to 1959.

Some embarrassment is also said to have been caused to M.I.T. scholars earlier in their dealings with foreign governments when it was disclosed that the agency had helped to create their center. Faculty opinion about the link was described as divided until Mr. Millikan passed word of the decision to accept no more research contracts with the agency.

The center's spokesman said the university had always protected itself adequately against direct involvement with or control of its work by the intelligence agency. It considered the research for the agency to be not only consistent with the traditions of academic freedom, he said, but also a fulfillment of the university's duty to contribute to the Government's intelligence "with a sma 'i' ".

There has been a "rigid rule" that no field work be undertaken with C.I.A. funds, he said.

When it was decided in Marc 1965, to sever all connections, he added, there was thought to be no reason to withdraw abruptly. Thus, the last contracts, running through June, 1966, were honored, he said.

Individual scholars will continue to have the right to act as consultants to the agency or to accept any other kind of Government assignment. This right has been enjoyed by most American scholars, even those at institutions, such as Harvard, that have refused to accept direct contracts from the intelligence agency.

C.I.A. OPERATIONS: A PLOT SCUTTLED

Plan to Doctor Cuban Sugar Depicts Control Problem

Following is the fourth of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other Times staff members.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 27—On Aug. 22, 1962, the S.S. Streatham Hill, a British freighter under Soviet lease, crept into the harbor of San Juan, Puerto Rico, for repairs. Bound for a Soviet port with 80,000 bags of Cuban sugar, she had damaged her propeller on a reef.

The ship was put in drydock, and 14,135 sacks were off-loaded to facilitate repairs. Because of the United States embargo on Cuban imports, the sugar was put under bond in a customs warehouse.

Sometime during the lay-up, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency entered the customs shed and contaminated the off-loaded sugar with a harmless but unpalatable substance.

Later, a White House official, running through some intelligence reports, came upon a paper indicating the sabotage. He investigated, had his suspicions confirmed and informed President Kennedy, much to the annoyance of the C.I.A. command.

The President was not merely annoyed; he was furious, because the operation had taken place on American territory, because it would, if discovered, provide the Soviet Union with a propaganda field day, and because it could set a terrible precedent for chemical sabotage in the undeclared "back-alley" struggle that rages constantly between the West and the Communist countries.

Mr. Kennedy directed that the doctored sugar not leave Puerto Rico. This was more easily ordered than done, and it finally required the combined efforts of the C.I.A., the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department, customs agents and harbor authorities to dis-intrigue the intrigue.

The Soviet Union never got its 14,135 sacks of sugar; whether it was compensated for them has not been disclosed.

It would be unfair to conclude that this was a typical C.I.A. operation. On the other hand, it cannot be dismissed as merely the unwise invention of some agent who let his anti-Communist fervor get out of control.

There is good reason to believe that a high-level political decision had been taken to sabotage, where feasible, the Cuban economy. The sugar project, harum-scarum as it was, developed from a general policy determination in the Plans Division of the C.I.A., and the general policy, if not the specific plot, presumably had the approval of the interagency, sub-Cabinet group responsible for reviewing all operations that could have political consequences.

This was not, then, a well-laid plan that went sour in the operation; it was a badly laid plan that was bound to cause trouble.

It is instructive because it illustrates many of the control problems in C.I.A. operations and makes plain why, from the outset, so many questions have been so persistently raised by so many critics about the adequacy of these controls.

A Major Concern

First, there is the pre-eminent concern whether the C.I.A., despite its disclaimers to the contrary, does on occasion make policy—not willfully, perhaps, but simply because of its capacity to mount an operation and pursue it wherever it may lead without day-by-day guidance or restriction from the political departments of the Government.

Operations like that of sabotaging the Cuban economy can lead to such dangerous episodes as the sugar doctoring; they can acquire a momentum and life of their own, the consequences of which cannot be anticipated by political officers who may have given them original approval.

Thus, it should be noted that, in the sugar tampering, the C.I.A. and its agents unquestionably believed they were operating within approved instructions, and consequently resented what they regarded as "interference" by the White House officer who reported it to the President.

Another example of operations assuming a life of their own occurred in 1954 during the C.I.A.-engineered revolution against the Communist-oriented President of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.

A P-38 fighter, piloted by an American, bombed a British ship, the Spring-Fjord, which was lying off-shore and was believed to be carrying aircraft to the Arbenz Government. Only one of the three bombs exploded, and no crew members were injured. The ship, which was actually carrying coffee and cotton, was beached.

Richard M. Bissell, a former C.I.A. deputy director for plans, has admitted that the bombing was a "sub-incident" that "went beyond the established limits of policy."

An outstanding example of an operation with political consequences was the dispatch of Francis Gary Powers on the U-2 flight from Pakistan to Norway across the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960, just before the Paris summit meeting and the scheduled visit of President Eisenhower to Moscow.

Unresolved Question

The U-2 photoreconnaissance flights had been going on for nearly five years, with fabulously profitable results. It was established practice for the President to approve in advance a set of flights within a given time span, and there was also established machinery for the approval of each flight by the Secretary of Defense. Yet, to this day, no one then in the top councils of the Government is able to say with certainty whether the Powers flight, the last in a series of six, was specifically approved by Thomas S. Gates Jr., then the Secretary of Defense.

One Senator has said that the U-2 flight was a perfectly legitimate operation of great value, and that the embarrassment to the President was not inherent in the project but was the result of a lack of coordination and controls.

"The operation," he said, "just went along regardless of the political circumstances."

A second serious control question derives from the special position of the C.I.A. as the Government's fountain of necessary information. This appears to be at once the major advantage and a principal hazard of the C.I.A. operation today.

"Policy," Allen W. Dulles, the former C.I.A. chief, once said, "must be based on the best estimates of the facts which can be put together. That estimate in turn should be given by some agency which has no axes to grind and which itself is not wedded to any particular policy."

This point is often made by the C.I.A. and its defenders. They cite, for instance, the agency's accurate estimate on Soviet missile strength, as a contrast to the inflated estimates that came from the Pentagon in the late Fifties. The latter, they say, were surely influenced by service rivalries and budgetary battles—such as the Air Force's desire for more missiles of its own. The C.I.A. has no such vested interest and little to gain by distorting or coloring its reports and estimates.

Mr. Dulles—like Secretary of State Dean Rusk—insists that no C.I.A. operation "of a political nature" has ever been undertaken "without appropriate approval at a high political level in our Government" outside the C.I.A.

The problem is that the facts presented to the Government by the C.I.A. are sometimes dramatic and inevitably tend to inspire dramatic proposals for clandestine operations that the agency's men are eager to carry out, and that they believe can—or might—succeed.

Long Odds Can Help

Even long odds sometimes work to the agency's advantage. President Eisenhower, for instance, has written that he undertook to aid pro-Western rebels in Guatemala in 1954 because Mr. Dulles told him the operation had only a 20 per cent chance to succeed. If the C.I.A. director had estimated a better chance than that, General Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs, he would have been unrealistic, unconvincing and overruled.

Command of the facts—at least the best facts available—plus zeal to do something about them, many critics fear, can make the C.I.A. an unanswerable advocate, not for a vested budgetary or policy interest, but for its own sincere notions of how to proceed. And its advantage of providing the facts on which decision must be made, these critics feel, can enable it to prevail over the advice or fears of political officers.

Thus, in 1958, Ambassador John Allison strongly opposed the plan of Allen Dulles to aid the rebel movement in Sumatra against President Sukarno of Indonesia. But Mr. Dulles had won the powerful support of his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Ultimately, the plan went forward—with the result that an American pilot was shot down and captured by the Sukarno forces, causing a conspicuous deterioration of relations between Indonesia and the United States. The plan was not unapproved; it was just unwise.

A third problem of control arises from the necessary secrecy that surrounds the agency. To protect its sources of information, to permit it to proceed with any form of clandestine operations, to guard the nation's political relations with most other countries, it is necessary for the C.I.A. to be shielded—and Congress has so shielded it, by law—from the ordinary scrutiny, investigation and public disclosure of activities that other Government agencies must undergo.

Within the agency, until the Bay of Pigs disaster of 1961, even the Intelligence Division was not allowed to know about the "dirty tricks" being planned and carried out by the Plans Division.

Stevenson in the Dark

Many of the highest Government officials are told nothing of some of the agency's activi-

United Press International

INVOLVED IN 1962 C.I.A. OPERATION: The S.S. Streatham Hill, a British freighter under Soviet lease, lying at anchor alongside two U.S. destroyers in San Juan, Puerto Rico, late in 1962. Her cargo of sugar was contaminated by C.I.A. agents when the ship put up for repairs en route from Cuba to the Soviet Union. The incident, designed by the intelligence agency to injure Cuban trade, instead incurred President Kennedy's wrath.

ties because, in the course of their own duties, they do not "need to know."

It is now well established, for instance, that until the disaster unfolded, Adlai E. Stevenson, the United States representative to the United Nations, knew nothing of the Bay of Pigs plan. As a result, he and his Government suffered grievous humiliation after he publicly misstated the facts.

In years past, C.I.A. secrecy reached some absurd proportions —with high-level employes identifying themselves solemnly at cocktail parties as "librarians" and "clerks." In its early days, for instance, C.I.A. employes who in their private lives needed to apply for credit were instructed by the agency to say, when asked for an employer's reference: "Call Miss Bertha Potts" at a certain number.

It was not long, of course, before the lenders who were told to call Miss Potts would say gleefully: "Oh, you work for the C.I.A."

For many years prior to 1961, a good many critics had been aware of the control dangers inherent in the C.I.A.'s peculiar position. In 1954, Senator Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, obtained 34 cosponsors for a bill to create a 12-member joint committee on intelligence to keep watch over the C.I.A., much as the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does over the Atomic Energy Commission.

Allen Dulles, who was completely satisfied with the scrutiny provided by four carefully selected subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, went to work. He succeeded in cutting away 14 of Mr. Mansfield's cosponsors, and the bill was defeated, 59 to 27.

Board Headed by Killian

A year later the second Hoover Commission also recommended a Congressional joint committee, as well as a Presidentially appointed board of consultants on intelligence activities.

To forestall the first, Mr. Dulles acquiesced in the second, and in January, 1956, President Eisenhower named a board of consultants on foreign intelligence activities, with James R. Killian Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as chairman.

Those familiar with the board's work in the Eisenhower years say it performed a useful function on the technical side, where Dr. Killian, for instance, was a powerful advocate in the development of the U-2. However, it is generally agreed that the board did not give very critical attention to "black" operations, and then only after the fact.

In 1954 there was also established by the National Security Council — which advises the President on defense and foreign policy matters—what came to be known as "the special group," or the "54-12 group," after the date (December, 1954) of the secret directive ordering its formation.

This directive also provided the basic charter for the agency's countersubversive and counter-Communist activity. Until that time, these activities had been undertaken under authority of a secret memorandum from President Truman issued in 1947 and inspired principally by the Italian, Czechoslovak and Berlin situations, then acute cold-war issues.

The 54-12 group was—and still is—composed of the President's special assistants for national security affairs, the director of the C.I.A., the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary (or Deputy Under Secretary) of State for Political Affairs, plus other officers consulted occasionally on particular proposals.

The group seems to have been created, partly at least, in response to public concern over the problem of control, and it was given responsibility for passing on intelligence operations beforehand. However, because of the fraternal relationship of Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, because of their close relations with President Eisenhower and because Allen Dulles had the power to give it the facts on which it had to base its decisions, the 54-12 group during the Eisenhower Administration is believed by knowledgeable sources to have exercised little real control.

The Classic Disaster

At the Bay of Pigs, just after President Kennedy took office in 1961, the worst finally happened; all the fears expressed through the years came true.

The Bay of Pigs must take its place in history as a classic example of the disaster that can occur when a major international operation is undertaken in deepest secrecy, is politically approved on the basis of "facts" provided by those who most fervently advocated it, is carried out by the same advocates, and ultimately acquires a momentum of its own beyond anything contemplated either by the advocates or those who supposedly "controlled" them.

Responsible officials of the Eisenhower Administration report, for instance, that the invasion plan was not even in existence, as such, when they went out of office on Jan. 19, 1961; there was nothing but a Cuban refugee force, available for whatever the incoming Administration might ultimately decide to do with it.

Yet the testimony of Kennedy Administration officials—Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., for instance—is

that the matter was presented to Mr. Kennedy by the C.I.A. advocates as if he were already committed to it and would have to cancel it rather than approve it. Mr. Sorensen even wrote in his book, "Kennedy," that Mr. Kennedy had been subtly pushed to be no less "hard" in his anti-Castroism than President Eisenhower supposedly had been.

The ultimate disaster and its various causes need no retelling. Their effect was graphically described by an official who saw the shaken Mr. Kennedy immediately afterward. The President, he said, "wanted to splinter the C.I.A. in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

At the same time, to Clark M. Clifford, a Washington lawyer and close friend, who had written the legislation setting up the C.I.A. during the Truman Administration, Mr. Kennedy said flatly and poignantly:

"I could not survive another one of these."

An Inquiry Ordered

But because he could not simply abolish the agency, much less its function, the President decided he would "get it under control."

First, he ordered a thorough investigation by a group headed by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and composed also of Allen Dulles, Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

Second, on Mr. Clifford's advice, the President recreated the old board of consultants under the title of the Foreign Intelligence Committee and asked Dr. Killian to resume the chairmanship. (Mr. Clifford became a member and later succeeded Dr. Killian as chairman.) The President directed the committee to investigate the whole intelligence community from "stem to stern," recommend changes and see that they were carried out.

Third, after a decent interval, the President replaced Allen Dulles with John A. McCone, a former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. He told the new director that he was not to be simply the director of the C.I.A. but should regard his primary task as "the coordination and effective guidance of the total United States intelligence effort." Mr. Dulles's key assistants were also removed.

Fourth, the President sent a letter to every Ambassador telling him he was "in charge of the entire diplomatic mission" at his post, including not only foreign service personnel but "also the representatives of all other United States agencies." These representatives of other agencies were to keep the Ambassador "fully informed of their views and activities" and would abide by the Ambassador's decisions "unless in some particular instance you and they are notified to the contrary."

The President followed this letter, which was made public, with a secret communication, saying he meant it and specifically including C.I.A. men among those responsible to the Ambassador.

A Blow to Bundy

Perhaps the most important change in control procedures, however, involved the 54-12 group within the political ranks of the Administration, and it came without any Presidential initiative.

The Bay of Pigs had dealt a severe psychological blow to McGeorge Bundy, who as the President's assistant for national security affairs was a member of the group, and perhaps also to his self-esteem. Thereafter he set about tightening up the surveillance of C.I.A. operations, subjecting them to searching analysis before and not after the event. The hard-eyed Mr. Bundy was notably relentless at that kind of administration.

The President accepted the advice of the Taylor and Killian investigations on two important questions.

First, he decided not to limit the C.I.A. to intelligence gathering and not to shift clandestine operations to the Pentagon, or to a special agency created for the purpose.

These ideas had found favor among some sections of the State Department, among many public critics and even among some members and the staff of the advisory committee. But it was stoutly opposed by Allen Dulles, who argued that this would result in duplication and rivalry, and that the two functions were interdependent, though he admitted that they had not been working in harness on the Bay of Pigs operation.

The two committees of inquiry agreed with Mr. Dulles, and so, finally, did the President.

Second, the committees recommended, and the President enthusiastically agreed, that the C.I.A. should leave sizable military operations to the Pentagon and henceforth limit itself to operations of a kind in which United States involvement would be "plausibly deniable." This, however, has proved to be a rule of thumb in which it is often difficult to hide the thumb.

Something Like Secrecy

For instance, the later creation of an air force of anti-Castro Cubans to fly for the Congolese Government was carried out and managed by the C.I.A., not by the Pentagon, despite the recommendation.

The obvious reason was that the agency could do the job in something like secrecy, while Defense Department involvement would have been necessarily more open, advertising the backing of the United States for the "instant air force."

It is beyond dispute, however, that the Bay of Pigs was a watershed in the life of the C.I.A. and its influence on policy-making. Before that, no matter how much administrative control and political approval there may have been, Mr. Dulles ran the agency largely as he saw fit.

He was able to do so because he could almost always get "approval"—and thus adhere to the forms of control — from his brother in the State Department or from President Eisenhower, with both of whom he had the closest relations of trust and liking.

The effect of the Kennedy shake-up was immediately apparent—on policy in Laos, for instance. W. Averell Harriman, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was given a free hand in getting rid of the American puppet, Premier Phoumi Nosavan — whose backing by the C.I.A. President Eisenhower had specifically approved — and reinstating Souvanna Phouma at the head of a neutralist government.

By general agreement of virtually every official interviewed, the C.I.A. does not now directly make policy, and its operations are under much more rigorous surveillance and control than before. Nevertheless, there continue to be—and probably always will be—instances where the controls simply do not work.

Uncertain Boundaries

Richard Bissell, who as deputy director for plans was largely responsible for the U-2 reconnaissance triumph and for the Bay of Pigs disaster, has explained why this must be.

"You can't take on operations of this scope," he has said, "draw narrow boundaries of policy around them and be absolutely sure that those boundaries will never be overstepped."

Recently, for instance, the C.I.A. was accused of supporting Cambodian rebels who oppose Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the head of state. Even some senior United States Foreign Service officers said they were not sure that the agency's firm denials meant no agent in the field, no obscure planner in the huge C.I.A. building in Virginia, had strayed from the strict boundaries of policy.

A high degree of control of C.I.A. activities exists, however, and inquiry produced this picture of the controlling agencies and how well the control works:

The 54-12 Group

The 54-12 group is the heart of the control system. Its members now are Admiral William F. Raborn, the C.I.A. director; U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and two Presidential assistants, Bill D. Moyers and Walt W. Rostow, who have replaced McGeorge Bundy in representing the White House.

This group meets once a week with a detailed agenda. It concentrates almost exclusively on operations. It approves all proposed operations and it passes in great detail on expenditures as small as $10,000 that have political implications or could prove embarrassing if discovered. Any differences are referred first to the Cabinet level and then, if necessary, to the President.

While the group approves every "black" operation, it does not necessarily clear all the routine intelligence-gathering activities of the agency. Nor, once approval has been given for a "black" operation, does it maintain a running supervision over every detail of its execution.

Under a given policy decision approving a guerrilla operation in a certain country, for instance, the 54-12 group might also have to approve something as specific and important as a bridge-blowing. But the over-all program would go on by itself under the direction of agents in the field.

Bureau of the Budget

Another form of control is that of the pursestring.

The C.I.A.'s annual request for funds, which is hidden largely in the Defense Department budget, is the responsibility of the head of the Budget Bureau's International Division. The request has usually fared well, but in the fiscal year 1965, for the first time in several years, it was cut back sharply by the bureau.

Another form of budgetary control centers on the agency's "slush fund," which used to be about $100-million a year and is now in "the tens of millions." One official has said that "the C.I.A. can't spend a dollar without Bureau of Budget approval." But another official put a somewhat different light on how the "slush fund" is handled.

Suppose, he said, that Country X is having an election and the candidates backed by the United States Government seem headed for defeat. The Ambassador and the C.I.A. station chief—the agency's chief in that country—may forward a request for some fast money to spread around.

The request, when reviewed and cleared by the middle levels of the State Department and the C.I.A., goes to the 54-12 group for review.

This group will first decide whether the money should be spent, how the C.I.A. should spend it and how much should be made available. Then the request goes to the Budget Bureau to be justified in budget terms against other needs.

A Call Brings the Money

For example, this official said, one such project was recently trimmed by the Budget Bureau from $3-million to $1.7-million. But in the last week of the election, the C.I.A. ran out of funds just as it needed some more billboards plastered, and it was able to get the money simply by a phone call to the Budget Bureau. This official explained that there had to be some way of providing "quick-turn money" under tight controls and audit.

It should also be noted that this form of control is purely budgetary and not substantive. The Bureau of the Budget does not interpose any policy judgment but simply weighs a proposed operation against total money available and the outlays for other projects.

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Another control agency is the Foreign ntelligence Advisory Board. This group has nine members. Four have had extensive government experience.

The chairman, Clark Clifford, was special counsel to President Truman from 1946 to 1950. Among the other members, Robert D. Murphy, former career Ambassador and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has had personal experience in clandestine operations, for he prepared the way for the American landing in North Africa in 1942. He is now a director of Corning Glass.

Gordon Gray, a director of the R. J. Reynolds Company and a newspaper owner, was Secretary of the Army under President Truman and later was President Eisenhower's special assistant for national security affairs. Frank Pace Jr., chairman of the Special Advisory Board, Air Force Systems Command, was director of the Bureau of the Budget in 1949-50 and Secretary of the Army from 1950 to 1953.

Two members are scientists connected with industry — William O. Baker, vice president in charge of research for the Bell Telephone Laboratories, a member for many years of the Science Advisory Board of the Air Force, and Edwin H. Land, chairman and president of the Polaroid Corporation, a former adviser to the Navy on guided missiles and an expert on photography.

There are two military representatives—General Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Ambassador to South Vietnam, and Admiral John H. Sides, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet from 1960 to 1963. Dr. William L. Langer, the ninth member, is Professor of History at Harvard and a frequent government consultant.

The board meets an average of one or one and one-half days a month. It is subdivided into two-man panels specializing in various fields, which meet more frequently. Individual members also take field inspection trips. Mr. Clifford went recently to South Vietnam; Mr. Gray has been on extensive trips to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

There is divergent opinion on the control value of this board. Some of its members are highly pleased with their own work. They point out that over the last four and one-half years they have made some 200 recommendations, of which the President accepted 95 per cent.

They take credit for persuading President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to create the Defense Intelligence Agency, combining the separate service intelligence divisions. This had been recommended by Secretary of Defense Gates and by Lyman Kirkpatrick, inspector general of the C.I.A., as a result of the widely differing estimates of the so-called "missile gap" in the late nineteen-fifties made by the intelligence arms of the services.

Another official in a position of authority, however, believes that the board does little more than provide a "nice audit" of C.I.A. operations and that any "control" it exercises is largely ex post facto. He asked what could be expected from a board that met only a few days a month.

"By 5 in the afternoon," he said, "the guys can't remember what they were told in the morning."

Even the members concede that their work has been aimed primarily at improving the efficiency and methods of the C.I.A., rather than at control of individual operations. Thus, if the board does investigate some "black" operations, its emphasis is placed on whether it was done well or could have been more successful, rather than on the political question of whether it should have been done at all.

One member reported, however, that the C.I.A. now brought some of its poposals to the committee for prior discussion, if not specific approval. This is not an unmixed blessing.

While the board might advise against some risky scheme, it also might not; in the latter case its weight added to that of the C.I.A., would present the responsible political officials in the 54-12 group with an even more powerful advocacy than usual.

An advantage of the board is its direct link to the President. Since this is augmented, at present, by Mr. Clifford's close personal and political ties to President Johnson, any recommendations the committee makes carry great weight with the bureaucrats of the C.I.A., even before they appear in a Presidential order.

State Department and Ambassadors

Also exercising some control over the C.I.A. are the State Department and Ambassadors. Secretary of State Rusk has confided to his associates that he is now quite certain the C.I.A. is doing nothing affecting official policy he does not know about. But he added that he was also sure he was the only one in the State Department informed about some of the things being done.

Despite this information gap as high as the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary levels, State Department officers with a need to know are far better informed about operations than before the Bay of Pigs.

Moreover, in the 54-12 group and in interagency intelligence meetings, State Department officers are now more ready to speak out and more likely to be heeded on proposed intelligence operations that they believe would compromise larger policy interests.

President Kennedy's secret letter to the Ambassadors also had some effect in changing a dangerous situation.

In 1954, William J. Sebald resigned as Ambassador to Burma because of continued C.I.A. support to Chinese Nationalists in northern Burma despite all his protests. In 1956, James B. Conant, Ambassador to West Germany, was not told about the tunnel under East Berlin. In 1960, in Laos, Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown was often bypassed as the C.I.A. helped prop up the American-backed Premier Phoumi Nosavan, against his advice. The same year, the Ambassador in Malaysia knew nothing of the Singapore operation that ultimately was to embarrass the State Department in 1965.

It is doubtful whether such things could happen today if an Ambassador is forceful enough in establishing his authority.

In the last four years the Ambassadors have been kept much better informed, and their relations with C.I.A. chiefs of station have been consequently more cordial. Ambassadors Clare Timberlake and Edward Gullion were completely posted on C.I.A. operations during the Congo crisis and worked closely with the agency. So, apparently, was Henry Cabot Lodge after he took over the embassy in Saigon in 1963.

While the Ambassador may not always be completely master in his own house, neither does it seem to be true—as a staff report of Senator Henry M. Jackson's subcommittee on national security staffing and operations said in 1962 — that the primacy of the Ambassador, supposedly established by the Kennedy letter, was largely "a polite fiction."

For example, Robert F. Woodward, Ambassador to Spain, vetoed a man chosen to be the C.I.A.'s Spanish station chief. And the State Department, while still complaining about the size of some C.I.A. stations, is now supposed to approve the number of agents in each diplomatic mission.

In secret testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the summer of 1965, Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann made plain that the creation of the Imbert military junta in the Dominican Republic in May was a State Department, and not a C.I.A., idea.

Asked whether the C.I.A. would have set up the junta without orders from State, Mr. Mann replied:

"I will say that in the past this may have been; I do not know. But since I arrived in January, 1964, I have had an understanding first with Mr. McCone and now with Admiral Raborn, and I am sure the department has, even more importantly, that the policy is made here [at State] and that nothing is done without our consent."

This "nothing" probably goes too far, since there remain areas of ambassadorial ignorance. An Ambassador is not always informed of "third-party" spying in his country — for example, spying in France on the Chinese Communists there. Nor is he given specific details on counterespionage and information gathering about which he may be generally informed.

If the C.I.A. has "bought the madam," as one official put it, of a house of ill fame patronized by influential citizens or officials of a host country, the Ambassador does not know it and probably doesn't want to. He would, however, have the dubious benefit of any information the madam might disclose.

These are the four institutional forms of "control" of the C.I.A. that now exist—save for Congressional oversight and the all-important role of the agency's director. And The New York Times's survey for these articles left little doubt that the newly vigorous functioning of these four groups has greatly improved coordination, more nearly assured political approval and substantially reduced the hazards implicit in C.I.A. operations.

Nevertheless, the agency still remains the fount of information on which many policy decisions rest, and the source of facts, selected or otherwise, on which to justify its own projects.

Nevertheless, the C.I.A. enjoys an inherent advantage in any conflict with the State or Defense Departments because of its undeniable expertise—especially in economics and science—and because it is free from such political entanglements as trying to build up a missile budget (as in the case of the Air Force) or of having to justify the recognition of a foreign leader (as in the case of State).

And nevertheless, in its legitimate need for secrecy, the C.I.A. simply cannot be subjected to as much public or even official scrutiny as all other agencies undergo.

A Call for More Control

For all these reasons, and because of occasional blunders, there has been no abatement in the demand of critics for more and stronger control. Inevitably, their call is for some form of increased supervision by the people's representatives in Congress, usually by a joint committee of the two houses.

The Times survey indicated a widespread feeling that such a committee would do the agency's vital functions more harm than good, and that it would provide little if any solution to the central problem of control.

The history of the Central Intelligence Agency since 1947 makes one thing painfully clear —that the control question, while real and of the utmost importance, is one of "not measures but men." The forms of control mean nothing if there is no will to control, and if there is a will to control, then the form of it is more or less irrelevant.

Such a will can only come from the high political officials of the Administration, and it can best be inspired in them by the direct example of the President.

But even the President probably could not impose his will on the agency in every case without the understanding, the concurrence and the vigorous and efficient cooperation of the second most important man in the matter of control—the director of the C.I.A.

The C.I.A.: Qualities of Director Viewed as Chief Rein on Agency

Special to The New York Times

Following is the last of five articles on the Central Intelligence Agency. The articles are by a team of New York Times correspondents consisting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other Times staff members.

WASHINGTON, April 28 — As copious evidence of a Soviet military build-up in Cuba, including the installation of anti-aircraft missiles, poured into Washington in the summer of 1962, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, John A. McCone, had a strong hunch about its meaning.

He believed such an arsenal half-way around the world from Moscow had to be designed ultimately to protect even more important installations — long-range offensive missiles and nuclear weapons yet to be provided.

Mr. McCone told President Kennedy about his hunch but specified that it was a personal guess entirely lacking in concrete supporting evidence. He scrupulously refused to impose his hunch on the contradictory documentary and photoanalysis evidence being provided by the intelligence community over which he presided. He continued to pass to the President and his advisers reports and estimates—based on all available evidence—that the Soviet Union was not likely to do what he believed in his heart it was doing.

When the evidence that the Russians had implanted offensive missiles in Cuba did come in, Mr. McCone was among those around the President who argued for quick, decisive air action before the missiles could become operative. But when the President decided on his blockade-and-ultimatum policy, Mr. McCone loyally supported it and helped carry it out.

Test-Ban Hearings

In 1963, Mr. McCone was personally in favor of the proposed limited nuclear test-ban treaty. He had backed such proposals since his years as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in the Eisenhower Administration.

Nevertheless, because of his desire that the facts should be known as fully as possible, he furnished a C.I.A. staff expert to assist Senator John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, chairman of an Armed Services subcommittee and an opponent of the treaty. This angered the White House and the State Department, but it was consistent with Mr. McCone's view of the C.I.A.'s role in informing the Government as fully as possible.

It is in this kind of intellectual effort to separate fact from fancy, evidence from suspicion, decision from preference, opinion from policy and consequence from guess that effective control of the C.I.A. must begin, in the opinion of most of those who have been surveyed by The New York Times.

And it is when these qualities have been lacking, the same officials and experts believe, that the C.I.A. most often has become involved in those activities that have led to widespread charges that it is not controlled, makes its own policy and undermines that of its political masters.

Inevitably, the contrast is drawn between John McCone and Allen W. Dulles, one of the most charming and imaginative men in Washington, under whose direction the C.I.A. grew to its present proportions and importance.

A Gambling Man

Digging a wiretap tunnel from West to East Berlin, flying spy planes beyond the reach of antiaircraft weapons over the Soviet Union and finding a Laotian ruler in the cafes of Paris were romantic projects that kindled Mr. Dulles's enthusiasm. Sometimes the profits were great; sometimes the losses were greater.

To Allen Dulles, a gambling man, the possibility of the losses were real but the chance of success was more important.

A 20 per cent chance to overthrow a leftist regime in Guatemala through a C.I.A.-sponsored invasion was all he wanted to give it a try. He charmed President Eisenhower with tales of extraordinary snooping on such rulers as President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic and with accounts of the romantic derring-do of Kermit Roosevelt in arousing Iranian mobs against Mohammed Mossadegh to restore the Shah to his throne.

As long as his brother, John Foster Dulles, was Secretary of State, Allen Dulles had no need to chafe under political "control." The Secretary had an almost equal fascination for devious, back-alley adventure in what he saw as a worldwide crusade.

Personal Judgments

Neither brother earned his high reputation by taut and businesslike administration. Both placed supreme confidence in their personal judgments.

Colleagues recall many occasions on which Allen Dulles would cut off debate about, say, the intentions of a foreign head of state with the remark: "Oh, I know him personally. He would never do that sort of thing."

Allen Dulles was also an accomplished politician. Throughout his regime he maintained the best of relations with the late Clarence Cannon of Missouri, who as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee was the key figure in providing C.I.A. funds.

MONITOR— J. A. FURCHAK

Mr. Dulles kept personal control of the selection of other members of Congress with responsibility for overseeing the C.I.A., with the result that he invariably had on his side those members of the Congressional establishment who could carry the rest of Congress with them.

Thus in the Dulles period at the C.I.A., there was a peculiar set of circumstances. An adventurous director, inclined to rely on his own often extremely good and informed intuition, widely traveled, read and experienced, with great prestige and the best connections in Congress, whose brother held the second-highest office in the Administration, and whose President completely trusted and relied upon both, was able to act almost at will and shielded from any unpleasant consequences.

Kennedy Kept Him in Office

When the Eisenhower Administration came to an end in 1961, Allen Dulles's reappointment was one of President Kennedy's first acts. Mr. Dulles, like J. Edgar Hoover, who was reappointed head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the same time, had great prestige and was thought to lend continuity and stability to the new Administration.

In fact, Mr. Dulles's continuance in office set the stage for the Bay of Pigs and the great crisis of the C.I.A.

In that incredible drama of 1961, it was Mr. Dulles's weaknesses as C.I.A. director — rather than, as so often before, his strengths—that came to the fore. He was committed to the Cuba invasion plan, at all costs, against whatever objections. The advocate overcame the planner.

As President Kennedy and others interposed reservations and qualifications, Mr. Dulles and his chief lieutenant, Richard M. Bissell, made whatever changes were required in order to keep the plan alive. For instance, they switched the landing site from the Trinidad area to the Bay of Pigs, to achieve more secrecy, thereby accepting an inferior beachhead site and separating the refugee force of invaders from the Escambray Mountains, where they were supposed to operate as guerrillas, by 80 miles of swamp.

Above all, lacking his old rapport with President Eisenhower and his brother, lacking a coldly objective approach to his plan, Mr. Dulles never realized that President Kennedy suffered from more than tactical reservations.

These misgivings—in reality a reluctance to approve the invasion — forced the frequent changes in plans, each weakening the whole, until whatever chance of success there might have been was gone.

At a Critical Hour

It was John McCone who replaced Allen Dulles at the C.I.A.'s most critical hour. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, it had barely escaped dismemberment, or at least the divorce of its Intelligence and Operations Divisions. There were also new cries for greater control, and the men around President Kennedy were suspicious of, if not hostile to, the agency.

Like Mr. Dulles, Mr. McCone devoted much energy to resisting a formal Congressional watchdog committee, to courting the senior members of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on Capitol Hill and to converting the members of a resuscitated Presidential advisory board to his view of intelligence policies.

But those who observed him work believe he also brought a keen intelligence and energy to a tough-minded administration of the agency itself and to careful, challenging study of its intelligence estimates and recommendations.

He broke down the rigid division between operations and analysis that had kept the C.I.A.'s analysts—incredible as it seems—ignorant of the Operations Division's specific plan to invade Cuba. And he began to subject the C.I.A.'s own action programs to vigorous review and criticism by the agency's own experts.

Incisive Questions

The intellectual level of meetings among intelligence officials at the C.I.A. and other agencies improved greatly under Mr. McCone, primarily because he put difficult and in-

cisive questions to those preparing formal analyses and plans, forcing them to challenge and defend their own judgments.

Above all, he set the hard example himself of putting aside personal preference, informed guesses and long gambles in favor of realistic weighing of available evidence and close adherence to administration policy.

He brought specialists and experts into conferences and decision-making at a much higher level of policy than before. Often he took such men with him to meetings at the Cabinet level. This exposed them to policy considerations as never before, and put policy-makers more closely in touch with the experts on whose "facts" they were acting.

As chairman of the United States Intelligence Board — a group that brings together representatives from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department's intelligence unit and others—Mr. McCone won a reputation for objectivity by frequently overruling the proposals of his own agency, the C.I.A.

Associated Press

CHIEFS OF THE C.I.A.: Allen W. Dulles, left, was replaced by John A. McCone, center, in 1961. Present director, Adm. William F. Raborn, right, has held the post for a year.

Some Criticism, Too

His regime was not without its critics. Many officials believe he narrowed the C.I.A.'s range of interests, which was as wide as the horizons under the imaginative Allen Dulles. For instance, they say, he was slow to mobilize the C.I.A. to obtain information about nuclear programs in India, Israel and other nations.

Mr. McCone also tried, but failed, to end interagency rivalries. He spent much time in bitter dispute with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara about divisions of labor and costs in technological programs and about chains of command in Vietnam. He is reported to have feared the growth of the Defense Intelligence Agency as an invasion of C.I.A. territory.

With the State Department, too, rivalry continued—and still does. Much of this can be attributed, on the diplomats' side, to the C.I.A.'s readier access to the upper levels of government and to its financial ability to underwrite the kind of research and field operations that State would like to do for itself.

On the agency's side, there is undoubtedly some resentment at the State Department's recently increased political control of C.I.A. operations. For instance, until April 28, 1965, the day President Johnson ordered the Marines into Santo Domingo, the C.I.A. had reported the possibility of a rebellion and it knew of three Communist-controlled groups functioning in the Dominican Republic, but the agency had not suggested an imminent threat of a Communist takeover.

When the President and his advisers became persuaded that there was such a threat, however, C.I.A. agents supplied confirming intelligence — some of it open to challenge by an alert reader. C.I.A. officials seem a little red-faced about this compliance, and the intimation is that the C.I.A. may have gone overboard in trying not to undermine but to substantiate a political policy decision.

Within the Bounds of Policy

Mr. McCone's pride and the fierce loyalty to the agency that he developed made him resentful of Congressional and public criticism, not always to his own advantage. Nevertheless, as a result of his single-minded efforts to control himself and his agency, other former members of the Kennedy Administration—many of whom opposed his appointment—now find it hard to recall any time when Mr. McCone or the C.I.A. in his time overstepped the bounds of policy deliberately.

Thus, they are inclined to cite him as proof of the theory that in the process of government men are more important than mechanics—and in support of the widespread opinion among present and former officials that the problem of controlling the C.I.A. must begin with men inside the agency itself.

The far more general belief is that Congress ought to have a much larger voice in the control of the agency. This belief is reinforced by the fact that the Congressional control that now exists is ill-informed, in the hands of a chosen few, subject to what the agency wishes to tell even these few, and occasionally apathetic.

There are four subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to which the director reports.

Mr. McCone met about once a month with the subcommittees. The present director, Adm. William F. Raborn, meets with them somewhat more often.

Conflicting Views

There are conflicting opinions on the value of these sessions. Some who participate say that they are "comprehensive," that the director holds back nothing in response to questions, that he goes into "great detail on budget and operations" and is "brutally frank." Others say that "we are pretty well filled in" but that the subcommittees get no precise information on the budget or the number of employes and that the director reveals only as much as he wants to.

These conflicting views probably reflect the composition and interests of the subcommittees. Those on the Senate side are said to be "lackadaisical" and "apathetic," with some Senators not wanting to know too much. The House subcommittees are said to be "alert, interested and efficient," with members insisting on answers to questions.

Representative George H. Mahon, Democrat of Texas, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, has warned the Administration it must itself police the C.I.A. budget more stringently than that of any other agency because he and other Congressmen believe they should protect the sensitive C.I.A. budget, as it comes to them, from the Congressional economy bloc and the agency's more determined critics.

As a result of this and other Congressional representations, the C.I.A. "slush fund" for emergencies has been reduced below $100-million. And—much to Mr. McCone's annoyance—President Johnson's economy drives resulted in an Administration reduction in the agency's general budget.

Three things, however, are clear about this Congressional oversight.

No Real Control

One is that the subcommittee members exercise no real control because they are not informed of all covert operations, either before or after they take place.

The second point regarding Congressional oversight is that a handful of men like Mr. Cannon and Senator Russell, with their great prestige, do not so much control the C.I.A. as shield it from its critics.

Finally, even these establishment watchdogs can be told just as much as the C.I.A. director thinks they should know. In fact, one or two of the subcommittee members are known to shy away from too much secret information, on the ground that they do not want either to know about "black" operations or take the chance of unwittingly disclosing them.

For all these reasons, there is a large body of substantial opinion—in and out of Congress

— that favors more specific monitoring of intelligence activity.

The critics insist that Congress has a duty periodically to investigate the activities of the C.I.A. and other intelligence arms; to check on the C.I.A.'s relations with other executive departments, study its budget and exercise greater and more intelligent oversight than the present diffused subcommittees, which operate without staff and with little or no representation from members most concerned with foreign affairs.

A Fountain of Leaks

But the overwhelming consensus of those most knowledgeable about the C.I.A, now and in the past, does not support the idea that Congress should "control" the C.I.A. A number of reasons are adduced:

¶Security. Congress is the well-known fountain of more leaks than any other body in Washington. The political aspirations of and pressures on members make them eager to appear in print; they do not have the executive responsibility weighing on them, and many C.I.A. operations could provide dramatic passages in campaign speeches.

¶Politics. Any standing committee would have to be bipartisan. This would give minority party members — as well as dissidents in the majority — unparalleled opportunities to learn the secrets of the executive branch and of foreign policy, and to make political capital of mistakes or controversial policies. Republicans, for instance, armed with all the facts and testimony that investigation could have disclosed, might well have wrecked the Kennedy Administration after the Bay of Pigs.

¶The Constitution. The C.I.A. acts at the direction of the President and the National Security Council. If a Congressional committee had to be informed in advance of C.I.A. activities, covert and overt, there might well be a direct Congressional breach of the constitutional freedom of the executive branch and of the President's right to conduct foreign policy.

¶Control. If a carefully chosen committee conscientiously tried to avoid all these dangers, it could probably exercise little real "control" of the kind critics desire. At best, for instance, it could probably do little more than investigate some questionable operations in secrecy and after they had taken place, and then report privately to the President, who might or might not respond.

¶Ideology. Congress is full of "professional anti-Communists" and has not a few "professional liberals." In its worldwide activities, the C.I.A. regularly takes covert actions that would profoundly offend either or both—for instance, supporting some non-Communists leftist against a military regime, or vice versa. To report this kind of activity to Congress would be certain to set off public debate and recriminations and lay a whole new set of domestic political pressures on the agency.

¶Policy. Knowledgeable men in Washington do not accept the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy as a desirable model for oversight of the C.I.A. They point out that the Atomic Energy Committee has developed its own staff of experts in its field, in some cases abler men than those in the Atomic Energy Commission, and these Congressional experts now have a vested interest in their own ideas of atomic policy and projects.

An Empire Foreseen

This, these sources fear, would be the outcome of a joint committee on intelligence —a new intelligence empire on Capitol Hill that could in time exert a direct policy influence on the C.I.A., separate from and challenging the President's policy decisions. This would diffuse rather than focus power over the agency and confuse rather than clarify the problem of control.

Other recommendations for a Congressional intervention have been advanced. The most drastic—and in some ways the most interesting—would be to legislate the separation of the C.I.A.'s intelligence and analysis function from the operations or "dirty tricks" function.

President Kennedy, after the Bay of Pigs, rejected a proposal to create a new and autonomous intelligence and analysis agency. This plan would have covert political operations under a small and largely anonymous section of the State Department.

If accepted, this plan would have had the great advantage, in terms of control, of divorcing "black" operators and their schemes from the source of information on which the decision to act must be made. Thus, the covert operators would have no more information than anyone else in government, no power to shape, color, withhold or manufacture information, and could, in effect, do only what they were told to do by political authorities.

It would also reduce the sheer size and power of the C.I.A. within the Government, much of which is based on its combination of functions—providing information, proposing action and having the ability to carry it out.

Efficiency Drop Feared

On the other hand, as Mr. Kennedy concluded, such a divorce might well lower the total covert and covert efficiency of the intelligence effort. Those who favor the present combined agency insist that intelligence and action officers must be close enough to advise one another—with analysts checking operators, but also profiting from the operators' experiences in the field.

Moreover, they point out that so-called paramilitary operations are more easily transferred on paper than in fact to the Defense Department. They note that the department, for instance, can by law ship arms only to recognized governments that undertake certain obligations in return, and cannot legally arm or assist, say, rebel groups or mercenaries, even for laudable purposes.

Nor could the Defense Department easily acquire the skill, the convenient "covers," the political talents and bureaucratic flexibility required for quick, improvised action in time of crisis.

As evidence of that, there is the case of the successful political and military organization of hill tribesmen in Vietnam carried out by the C.I.A. some years ago. When the Army won control of the operation in a bureaucratic in-fight, the good beginning was lost in a classic bit of military mismanagement, and the tribal project collapsed.

As for the State Department's taking over covert operations, the opponents ask, how could the department survive the inevitable exposure of some bit of political skulduggery in some other country, when it is supposed to be the simon-pure vessel of the United States' proper diplomatic relations?

A Less Drastic Plan

A far less drastic but perhaps more feasible approach would be to add knowledgeable Congressional experts in foreign affairs to the military and appropriations subcommittees that now check on the C.I.A.

Along this line is the idea backed by Senator McCarthy—that a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should be added to the existing watchdogs.

Such men as J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Senate Democratic leader, and George D. Aiken of Vermont, a Republican member of the Foreign Relations Committee, might bring greater balance and sensitivity to the present group of watchdog subcommittees.

Most of those interviewed in the New York Times survey for these articles also believed that the C.I.A. should have no influence on the selection of members of the subcommittees.

While the excuse for giving the agency a voice is to make sure that only "secure" and "responsible" members of Congress are chosen, the net effect is that the agency usually manages to have itself checked by its best friends in Congress and by those who can best shield it from more critical members like Senator McCarthy and Senator Mansfield.

Fund Slash Proposed

Finally, many observers consider that it might be useful for some select, nonpermanent committee of independent-minded members of Congress to make a thorough, responsible study of the whole intelligence community. Such a group might set out to determine how much of the community's activity is actually needed or useful, and how much of the whole apparatus might be reduced in size and expense—and thus in the kind of visibility that brings the C.I.A. into disrepute overseas and at home.

One former offical said quite seriously that he was not sure how much the nation would lose in vital services if all the activities of the C.I.A apart from those dealing with technological espionage—satellites and the like—had their budgets arbitrarily reduced by half.

A number of others suggested that it was possible for a great many of the C.I.A.'s information-gathering functions and study projects to be handled openly by the State Department, if only Congress would appropriate the money for it.

But the State Department is traditionally starved for funds by members of Congress who scoff at the "cookie-pushers" and the "striped-pants boys." The same members are often quite willing to appropriate big sums, almost blindly, for the secret, "tough" and occasionally glamorous activities of the spies, saboteurs and mysterious experts of the C.I.A.

As another example of what a specially organized, responsible Congressional investigation might discover, some officials expressed their doubts about the National Security Agency. This Defense Department arm specializes in making and breaking codes, spends about $1-billion a year—twice as much as the C.I.A.—and, in the opinion of many who know its work, hardly earns its keep.

But to most of those interviewed, the question of control ultimately came down to the caliber and attitude of the men who run the C.I.A., and particularly its director.

The present director, Admiral Raborn, is a man who earned a high reputation as the developer of the Navy's Polaris missile but who had no previous experience in intelligence work. Nor is he particularly close to President Johnson or to other high Administration officials.

Inauspicious Start

The admiral took office on a bad day—the one on which Mr. Johnson dispatched the marines to Santo Domingo last April.

Admiral Raborn and his predecessor, Mr. McCone, lunched together in downtown Washington that afternoon, unaware of the imminent intervention. As they parted, Admiral Raborn offered Mr. McCone a ride to the Langley, Va., headquarters of the C.I.A But Mr. McCone said he was going home to pack his clothes.

Those who know of this exchange have a hunch that if Mr. McCone had accepted the invitation and returned to the turmoil that quickly developed in his old office, the history of the intervention might have been different. Many are inclined to blame Admiral Raborn, in any event, for the mishmash of hasty evidence the C.I.A. contrived to justify the State Department's claim that there was a threat of a Communist uprising.

One reason the admiral was chosen, after President Johnson had searched for six months for a successor to Mr. McCone, was that as head of the Polaris project he had shown great ability to work with and mollify inquisitive Congressmen.

Another was that his military background made him an unlikely target for charges of being too "soft" or too liberal for his post. The same consideration influenced President Kennedy in choosing the conservative Republican John McCone, and it is notable that no leading figure of the Democratic party, much less one of its liberals, has ever been the agency's director.

Because of his lack of experience in intelligence and international affairs, it is widely believed among present and former officials that Admiral Raborn was chosen primarily as a "front man." Ironically, the Congress that he was supposed to impress is actually concerned—interviews disclosed—because he has not seemed to have the sure grasp of the agency's needs and activities that would most inspire confidence in it.

Raborn Defended

Knowledgeable sources say the C.I.A. itself, in its day-to-day business, is a bureaucracy like any other, functioning routinely whatever the quality of its leadership. These sources argue that the experience and professionalism of its staff are so great that any lack of these qualities in Admiral Raborn is scarcely felt.

But they do not agree that "Red" Raborn is just a front man. He is different—as would be expected—from any director who preceded him, but there is evidence available to suggest that he may not be such an unfortunate choice as has been suggested in a number of critical articles in the press.

The admiral is said to have President Johnson's confidence, although in a different way from the confidence President Kennedy placed in Mr. McCone. The latter was a valued member of the group that argued out high policy and influenced the President's decisions, not with facts but also with opinions and recommendations.

Admiral Raborn is said to to make little effort to exert such an influence on policy. Partly, this is because Mr. Johnson apparently does not want the C.I.A. director in such a role—and among those interviewed by The New York Times there was a belief that one reason John McCone left the post was that he could not play as influential a role as he had in the Kennedy Administration.

Among knowledgeable officials, moreover, Admiral Raborn is credited with at least two administrative developments within the agency—both stemming, again, from his Navy background.

He has installed an operations center, not unlike a military command post or a Navy ship's "combat information center." In it, round-the-clock duty officers constantly monitor communications of every sort. They can instantly communicate with the White House, State Department, Pentagon and agents in the field, by means of the agency's wizardry with machines and electronics.

This represents primarily a drawing together and streamlining of capabilities the agency already had, but it is rated as a positive advance in C.I.A. efficiency.

Long-Range Planning

The other Raborn innovation is a Navy-like system of long-range management planning. He has assigned a group of officials to "look ahead" for decades at the shape of the world to come.

Out of this continuing study, the admiral hopes to be able to make more precise plans for the agency's needs in manpower, money, equipment and organization in, say, 1975, so that it can be planned for right now.

There persists among many interested in the C.I.A., however, a reluctance to accept the idea that the agency should be headed by anyone other than an experienced, strong executive with a wide grasp of international affairs and intelligence work, strong ties to the Administration and the knowledge and determination to keep the agency's work within the limits of policy and propriety.

This concern has been heightened by the departure from the White House of McGeorge Bundy, now president of the Ford Foundation. As Mr. Johnson's representative on the 54-12 group, he was probably second only to the director of the C.I.A. in maintaining "control" and took an intense interest in this duty.

Thus, if the White House replacements, Bill D. Moyers and Walt W. Rostow, prove either less interested or less forceful in representing the White House interest in C.I.A. operations, and if Admiral Raborn's alleged lack of experience in intelligence and foreign affairs handicaps him, effective control of the agency could be weakened without any change at all in the official processes of control.

Promotion Debate

Some people concluded even before the end of the admiral's first year that the difficulties of finding a succession of suitable C.I.A. directors made it advisable to promote impressive professionals from within the agency.

The most widely respected of these is the deputy director, Richard Helms, who was said to have been Mr. McCone's choice to succeed him.

Others argue, however, that intelligence is too dangerous a thing to be left to professional spies and that a loyal associate of the President's with the political qualifications for a senior Cabinet position should hold the post.

Whatever his identity, however, the prime conclusion of The New York Times survey of the Central Intelligence Agency is that its director is or should be the central figure in establishing and maintaining the actual substance of control, whatever its forms may take. For if the director insists, and bends all his efforts to make sure, that the agency serve the political administration of the government, only blind chance or ineptitude in the field is likely to take the C.I.A. out of political control.

Conclusions of Study

A number of other conclusions also emerge from the study:

¶Whatever may have been the situation in the past, and whatever misgivings are felt about Admiral Raborn, there is now little concern in the Johnson Administration or among former high officials, and there is even less evidence, that the C.I.A. is making or sabotaging foreign policy or otherwise acting on its own.

¶When C.I.A. operations acquire a life of their own and outrun approved policy, they often follow a pattern well known also in less secret arms of government. Diplomats frequently say more than they are told to say to other governments or otherwise exceed their instructions. Foreign aid and propaganda operations, though "public," can commit the United States to practices and men in ways not envisioned by Washington. Military operations can escalate by their own logic, and when things go wrong the Pentagon has at times been more reluctant than the C.I.A. in producing the facts.

¶Nonetheless, while the C.I.A. acts as the Government's fountain of information as well as its "black" operating arm, while it is the C.I.A. that both proposes operations and supplies the facts to justify them, the danger of its getting out of control of the Administration exists and ought to be taken seriously within and without the Government. The Bay of Pigs stands as enduring testimony to that fact.

¶The task of coping with this danger is essentially that of the President, his highest officials and the director of the C.I.A. It can only be met peripherally by Congressional oversight, and then with increased danger of security leaks and domestic political pressures on the agency.

¶The charges against the C.I.A. at home and abroad are so widespread and in many ways so exaggerated that the effectiveness and morale of the agency may be seriously impaired. In particular, there could ultimately be a problem in recruiting and keeping the high caliber of personnel upon whom the agency must rely both for doing useful work and for keeping that work within proper bounds.

Crucial Questions

Thus, there must be in this and in any Administration a tight, relentless, searching review and analysis of the C.I.A. and its activities, meeting squarely and answering honestly at least these questions:

Is any proposed operation or activity likely, on balance, to make a genuine and necessary contribution, in the long view as well as the short, to legitimate American interests and aspirations in the world, or is it merely convenient, expedient and possible without regard to its wider implications or to the real necessity for it?

In sum, is the government of a proud and honorable people relying too much on "black" operations, "dirty tricks," harsh and illicit acts in the "back alleys" of the world? Is there some point at which meeting fire with fire, force with force, subversion with subversion, crime with crime, becomes so prevalent and accepted that there no longer remains any distinction of honor and pride between grim and implacable adversaries?

These questions are a proper and necessary concern for the people of the United States. They are a proper and necessary concern for Congress. But in the nature of the case, neither the people nor Congress can easily learn the answers, much less insure that the answers are always the right ones.

The President's Task

That can only be done within the executive branch, by the highest authorities of the Government. Controlling the C.I.A. is a job that rests squarely upon the President of the United States, the director of the agency and the officials appointed by the President to check its work. And if these men are to insist that they do control the agency, then they are the ones

who must be blamed if control fails.

"Those who believe that the United States Government on occasion resorts to force when it shouldn't," Richard Bissell, the C.I.A.'s former deputy director, once said, "should in all fairness and justice direct their views to the question of national policy and not hide behind the criticism that whereas the President and Cabinet generally are enlightened people, there is an evil and ill-controlled agency which imports this sinister element."

The New York Times study of the C.I.A. suggests that it is not an invisible government but the real government of the United States upon which the responsibility must lie whenever the agency may be found "out of control." For if that responsibility is accepted, there can be no invisible government.